

Report of the Judicial Council of the State of Nevada's Statewide Court Security Task Force

Preface

In response to growing concerns regarding the safety and security of Nevada's courthouses, judges, judicial employees, and citizens, the Judicial Council of the State of Nevada (JCSN) approved, in April 2005, the creation of a Statewide Court Security Task Force (Task Force) to assess the security of the courts in Nevada and to make recommendations for improving security in these facilities. The Task Force was charged with the following goals:

1. Security assessment of all courts in the state.
2. Research "best practices" nationwide.
3. Use the "best practices," the Ten Elements for Courtroom Safety and Security from the National Center for State Courts, and findings of the assessment to establish minimum standards that can be implemented for all courts in the State.
4. Provide assistance for local courts to help in planning and implementing security.
5. Assist in information and technical security.
6. Provide assistance in preparing emergency plans for the courts.
7. Establish statewide policies and procedures.
8. Work with local courts and governments in implementing security standards.

The importance of these goals and the work of the task force were reinforced by the sniper shooting of Judge Chuck Weller in Reno on June 12, 2006, and by the increasing number of threats made against judges and other members of the judicial family during 2006 (Appendix A). These events further illuminated the need for the work of the Task Force.

Assessment

In order to assess the security situation in Nevada's courts, the Task Force conducted two surveys in March 2006 (Appendix B). The surveys highlighted areas of key concern:

1. Many courts, both rural and urban, are simply unaware of the status of security in their courthouses. A significant number of courts were unable to respond to some of the most basic areas of the survey because they were uncertain as to what security systems might be in place or the way in which their courthouses actually functioned. The survey indicated many courts are not familiar with some very fundamental issues in their courthouse such as building construction, weapons storage, key control, emergency systems, and alarms. The need for primary stakeholders in each court (e.g., judges, staff, security officers, and maintenance staff) to be knowledgeable and work together toward improved security was clear. Responses to the surveys also highlighted a number of zero- or low-cost initiatives that many courts could implement quickly and efficiently.
2. The rural courts face very unique issues and circumstances relating to security. The vast majority do not possess adequate physical equipment to maintain security during regular operating hours or off-hours. Only half of the rural courts possess metal detectors; but all urban courts do. Funding is clearly limited in the rural areas and security officer coverage is minimal.
3. The disparity of responses to the various links between law enforcement agencies speaks to the overall lack of communication between courts and emergency

- responders in an emergency situation. Some courts are able to communicate via radio or other means with a unit in the sheriff's office, however, most cannot. Those that can link with local police cannot link with state police, and only one court indicated their radios are linked to the fire department.
4. The vast majority of courts in the rural areas do not have formalized, current, and clearly defined security and emergency evacuation procedures, but most urban courts do. The opportunity to share information amongst courts clearly exists.
 5. As a result of their limited space, rural courts are significantly unable to provide separate and restricted areas for witnesses and are routinely bringing prisoners through public areas.

Meetings

Task Force, April 14, 2006

The results of the survey were presented at the first of the three Task Force meetings that have been held to date. This first meeting took place April 14, 2006, at the Supreme Court Building in Carson City, and was chaired by Justice Michael L. Douglas of the Nevada Supreme Court. Discussion at this meeting included an overview of court security in Nevada, presentation of the survey results, a focusing of the goals and expected outcomes of the Task Force, exploration of issues surrounding the cost and funding of court security, and avenues for information sharing. At this meeting the Task Force also created a Zero-Cost Subcommittee to study and develop ideas for zero-cost and low-cost security measures that could be implemented by courts.

Zero-Cost Subcommittee, June 6, 2006

The Zero-Cost Subcommittee met on June 6, 2006, and discussed recommendations for security measures that can be implemented by courts at zero or low cost. The subcommittee broke their recommendations into four priority areas: communications, threat assessment, a centralized document, and political education. These four areas will be explored further in this report in the "recommendations" section.

Task Force, July 28, 2006

The Task Force met for second time at the Regional Justice Center (RJC) in Las Vegas, and the meeting agenda included a tour of the RJC facility. This meeting focused on the response to the June 12, 2006, sniper shooting of Second Judicial District Family Court Judge Chuck Weller. Representatives of the Washoe County Sheriff's Office described their response to the incident and the lessons learned from the incident, including the need for improved communication. The Task Force also discussed that security personnel were prepared for an active shooter in the building, but that this incident posed a challenge in that it was perpetrated by a sniper outside the building. The U.S. Marshal Service presented the findings of a security audit of the RJC as well as information and best practice the Marshal's Services uses in protecting federal judges and courthouses. The Marshal Service offered their judicial profile, which they use to collect information on judges for security, to the committee.

Task Force, October 26, 2006

The third meeting of the Task Force took place at the Sparks Justice Court and Reno Municipal Court. Task Force Members toured the Sparks Justice Court Facility, and met

at the Reno Municipal Court to focus on the personal security of judges, jurors, key witnesses, and court personnel. The Task Force considered a draft of the Nevada Supreme Court Personal Security Handbook (Appendix C) compiled by Administrative Office of the Courts staff from best practices from a variety of sources. The Task Force discussed challenges faced at court across the states, and the special challenges faced by members of the judicial family in small rural communities. There was also discussion regarding the potential for state and federal appropriations to fund court security measures.

Task Force, May 18, 2007

The Task Force met at the Supreme Court Building and Regional Justice Center in Las Vegas to consider a draft report and discuss the continued operation the Task Force. The Task Force edited the report, and the inclusions are seen herein, and decided to continue the Task Force as more of a forum for discussion of court security issues, with meetings every six months.

Recommendations

Operation Security: Standard Operation Procedures

Courts should implement operating procedures for safety and security and ensure that staff and other users of the courthouse facility understand, implement, and follow the procedures. The Nevada Supreme Court is developing a draft safety and security manual that can be adapted by courts. The table of contents for manual, which included the key elements of any plan, is included as Appendix D.

Facility Security Planning: The Self-Audit Survey of Court Facilities

Courts should conduct a self-audit survey of their facilities using the instrument in Appendix E. The U.S. Marshal Service can also provide assistance with security audits at no or low cost.

Emergency Preparedness and Response: Continuity of Operations and Disaster Recovery

Courts must identify existing command structures, protocols, and communication routes to ensure continued operation in the event of an emergency. The Nevada Supreme Court draft safety and security manual provides information. Courts also need to remain in open communication with each other to learn from incidents that take place in other jurisdictions. The State Justice Institute's "The Planning for Emergencies: Immediate Events and Their Aftermath: A Guideline for Local Courts" can also be a resource in planning for emergencies. The document is available from John McCormick, Rural Courts Coordinator at AOC.

Threat Assessment

Courts must develop an effective way of reporting threats to law enforcement that captures all necessary intelligence data. All Nevada Courts are encouraged to participate in the Conference of Chief Justices/Conference of State Court Administrators/National Center for State Courts online threat reporting pilot project in aid in the development of effective threat reporting tools. More information on the pilot project is available from

John McCormick, Rural Courts Coordinator or David Albert, Facility Manager and Special Events Coordinator at the AOC.

Adapted from the National Center for State Courts' *Essential Ten Elements for Effective Safety and Security Planning* (Appendix F).

Funding, Security and Equipment Costs, and Partnerships and Resources

Courts need to implement all zero and low cost security improvements that they can before seeking additional funding. The recommended zero and low cost improvements recommended by the Task Force are:

Communications

- Identify a security manager for each court
- Hold meetings of internal users of communications systems in multiple user buildings
- Hold meetings of external users of communications systems to enhance interagency cooperation
- Post appropriate signage

Threat Assessment

- Invite local law enforcement to do a threat assessment of each court
- Identify facility security problems
- Invite city/county managers and staff to tour the court facilities and brief them on the problems and zero-cost measures already taken

A Centralized Document

- A comprehensive centralized document is the foundation and should be used in conjunction with a user-friendly desktop guide.
- A centralized document needs to make provisions for educating staff
- An essential element of a centralized document is promulgation of building opening and closing procedures.

Political Education

- A method must be devised to take our results and educate city/county decision makers.
- Such a method must invite rather than demand participation.

Additional funding opportunities are few and far between; thusly, it is imperative for courts to advocate for increased appropriations for this purpose at both the state and federal level. "One-shot" appropriations may be more realistic to obtain at the state level. Courts also need to forge a positive, cooperative relationship with local decision making bodies and accurately convey the importance of court security funding as way to protect the public and enhance access to justice.

Also important is that the courts to explore the availability of security equipment from other jurisdictions. This is particularly applicable to rural jurisdictions that may be able

to obtain usable equipment from urban jurisdictions. The AOC could be used a central point of contact to facilitate this exchange of resources.

New Courthouse Design

Any new courthouses constructed must take security and safety into account during the planning and construction process. The National Center for State Courts can provide assistance.

Other Recommendations

- Bailiff's/Law Enforcement Personnel should be available at all times in court and in clerks' offices.
- Distribute the Nevada Supreme Court Personal Security Handbook to all judges and court personnel.
- Develop comprehensive weapons policies for courthouses by including all stakeholders in policy creation discussions. Use AB191 of the 2007 Legislative Session as model for policy (Appendix G).
- Coordinate security training needs with Judicial Education to facilitate the transfer of timely and relevant information, and work with Judicial Education to ensure appropriate security measures are provided at all seminars and trainings.
- Maintain open lines of communication between courts and court staff to facilitate the sharing of court security information and best practices.
- Change the format of the Court Security Task Force to a court security forum discussion every six months.
- Develop a resource list to facilitate the transfer of information and documents.
- Develop a standing committee to conduct security and safety audits and other specialized court security services for Nevada Courts at the direction of the Chief Justice.

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RONALD R. TITUS
Director and
State Court Administrator

DATE: January 29, 2007
TO: Jose Dimas, Government Relations Associate
FROM: John McCormick, Rural Courts Coordinator
RE: Threats to Judicial Safety and Security in Nevada

Calendar year 2006 saw a number of threats to judicial safety and security, and the nationally publicized shooting of a family court judge for the Second Judicial District in Reno, Nevada.

On June 12, 2006, Judge Chuck Weller was shot by a sniper while standing by his third floor window in the Washoe County Courthouse. The man charged with shooting, as well as with the murder of his estranged wife, had been a litigant in Judge Weller's courtroom. The details of the case, as reported by the Reno Gazette-Journal, can be followed at:

<http://www.rgj.com/blogs/judge-shooting/>

The shooting of Judge Weller prompted Senate Majority leader Harry Reid of Nevada to call for increased Congressional funding for court security measures across the county.

In addition to the sniper incident, the Second Judicial District also experienced:

- Rock throwing at the first floor of the courthouse (three separate incidents) in November 2006.
- Aggressive behavior toward the Probate Court Master, necessitating her assignment to a secure parking garage space in September 2006.
- E-mail sent to a District Court Judge referencing the Judge Weller shooting that had implications that required a law enforcement investigation in October 2006.
- Two incidents of veiled threats, one made by anonymous letter and one made by telephone, were logged against Reno Municipal Court Judges.

The Eighth Judicial District, which covers Las Vegas, saw threats at about the rate of one per month. The most serious threat was made against a Family Court Judge and resulted in the arrest of an armed father who had threatened to kidnap his son and kill the judge. The Eighth Judicial District also investigated a threat against a law clerk, a threatened riot over sentencing, and threat to assassinate a judge during 2006.

Appendix A

Nevada's rural jurisdictions also saw threats made against judicial officials with the most serious threat occurring in Ely, Nevada which is home to a maximum security prison. In this situation, a prison inmate made a serious and credible threat against the life of the Seventh Judicial District Judge who sentenced him. The incident is under investigation by the Nevada Department of Corrections, Inspector General's Office, and resulted in the funding of two bailiffs to increase security at the White Pine County Courthouse.

The Justice of the Peace in Stateline, Nevada at South Lake Tahoe was forced to obtain a Temporary Protection Order Against Stalking and Harassment against a defendant in his court who had threatened the Judge and his Wife.

Additionally, many rural judges, whose courtrooms lack basic security features have obtained concealed weapons permits as a way of providing for their personal security.

The following is a list of informational attachments:

1. A news story from the Reno Gazette-Journal about the Judge Weller shooting
2. A news story from NBC News about the Judge Weller shooting
3. A news story from ABC News about the Judge Weller Shooting
4. The press release from Senator Reid's office regarding the Judge Weller shooting
5. A news story from the Ely Times Newspaper regarding the funding of bailiffs as a result of the threat made against the Seventh Judicial District Judge
6. A copy of the Temporary Order for Protection Against Stalking and Harassment filed by the Justice of the Peace in Stateline, NV

Enclosures

cc: Ron Titus, Director

Appendix A

[http://news.rgj.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?
AID=/20060614/NEWS10/101250011/1002/NEWS01&theme=SNIPER](http://news.rgj.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20060614/NEWS10/101250011/1002/NEWS01&theme=SNIPER)



Judge told officials Mack had harassed him in past

Martha Bellisle (MBELLISLE@RGJ.COM)

RENO GAZETTE-JOURNAL

January 24, 2007

The family court judge shot in the chest by a sniper on Monday told officials in the ambulance that he had been "attacked" on the Internet by "one angry man" who had started a campaign against him.

That man's name was Darren Roy Mack.

Judge Chuck Weller, 53, was shot about 11:10 a.m. Monday as he stood by his window in the Reno Justice Court.

A shooter, who police suspect was Mack, had positioned himself atop a downtown rooftop, possibly a parking garage, directly across the Truckee River from the judge's window, and fired one shot that hit the judge just below his left collarbone, and just above his heart.

While initially in critical condition, Weller has been released from the hospital and is staying in an undisclosed location. Mack remains at large, and police warn that he is armed and dangerous.

During his ride to Washoe Medical Center, Weller said he was concerned for his family's safety, and offered Mack's name as one who had made threats, said Jim Denton, a spokesman for the judge's family and a political consultant who ran Weller's 2004 campaign for judge.

Mack reportedly had started a blog attack against Weller, who was handling Mack's contentious divorce from his wife, Charla. She has since been found dead, and Mack is wanted in her death.

A father's advocacy group had told Weller that "one angry man was starting a campaign against him, using friends, associates, the media and anonymous blogs to ruin Judge Weller's reputation," Denton said.

That group, Nevadans for Equal Parenting, issued a statement on its Web site Wednesday saying their thoughts and prayers go out to the judge and Charla Mack's family.

"Nevadans for Equal Parenting condemns the violent and senseless crimes which have occurred this week in Reno," the group said. "We hope if any good can come of this tragedy it will be that we take a close look at the current situation in our courts and hopefully make positive changes."

Weller also said he was harassed in another way recently.

Appendix A

A anonymous person, using cash, had taken out an ad in the "Big Nickel" stating that Weller had a Harley-Davidson motorcycle for sale. The ad listed Weller's wife's name, and directions to their home, Denton said.

"Weller owned no Harley and had never placed such an ad," Denton said. "Bikers started showing up at his house at 7 a.m. on Saturday morning in answer to an ad promising an auction of an expensive Harley motorcycle."

Denton said Weller called the police and court security about the ad. An investigation found an anonymous person had paid cash.

Soon after the motorcycle incident, Weller said his family was awakened in the middle of the night by their dogs, which were barking intensely.

"Therefore, when Weller was shot, he said his first concern was for his family's safety from someone who had his home address," Denton said.

Appendix A

**NBC: Cops expect Reno suspect to surrender**

Pawn-shop owner sought in judge's shooting, killing of his estranged wife

The Associated Press

Updated: 3:59 p.m. PT June 14, 2006

RENO, Nev. - A manhunt continued Wednesday for a pawn shop owner who is charged with killing his estranged wife and suspected in the sniper shooting of a judge in their divorce case, police said.

NBC News has learned that police believe the suspect in the case, Darren Mack, 45, wants to surrender to a relative in California, and they also theorize that Mack drove to Sacramento, a short drive from Reno,

Judge Chuck Weller was shot in the chest on Monday as he stood near his third-floor office window at the county courthouse, police said. Shortly afterward, Charla Mack was found dead in the garage of her apartment, and authorities launched a manhunt for her husband.

The two attacks apparently happened within hours of each other, police said, though it wasn't immediately clear which was first.

Darren Mack was charged with murder in her killing and is considered a "person of interest" in the shooting at the courthouse, Reno Deputy Police Chief Jim Johns said Tuesday.

Darren Mack "had recent dealings with the judge and the family court section," Johns said, but police "do not have enough information to say he is a suspect."

Weller, a 53-year-old family court judge, was hospitalized in good condition Tuesday, and Johns said he was in good spirits. Weller's assistant also had bullet fragments removed from her arm and hip and was released from a hospital, police spokesman Steve Frady said.

The courthouse shooting Monday morning led to a shutdown of a six-block area near downtown as SWAT teams searched parking garages, high-rise construction sites and a movie theater for the gunman. Flights were briefly suspended at Reno-Tahoe Airport and some planes were searched after a vehicle that looked like Mack's was spotted, but Mack wasn't found.

'Hyper state of vigilance'

"The lead was strong enough that police responded with a large group of officers," airport spokesman Brian Kulpin told The Associated Press. "The entire airport was searched and will continue to be searched. We're in a hyper state of vigilance."

According to Washoe County District Court records, Charla Mack, 39, filed for divorce on Feb. 7, 2005, and a mutual restraining order was signed in May 2005. A custody hearing was scheduled for this September before Weller.

Mack owns a Reno jewelry store and pawn shop within a few blocks from the courthouse. His photo, along with his wife and three children, appears on a Web site advertising the sale of diamonds and other jewelry. The children were not injured.

Darin Conforti, court administrator of Reno Justice Court, said that shooting was shocking but that the risk of an attack was not.

"We're well aware this is the inherent risk of trying to solve conflicts," he said. "Sometimes you don't solve them peacefully and people take the law into their own hands."

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Appendix A

URL: <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/13282424/>

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Appendix A



Nevada Family Court Judge Allegedly Shot Over Divorce Ruling

Courts Boost Security as Judge's Increasingly Become Targets

By **NANCY WEINER**

June 16, 2006 — - The shooting of a family court judge this week in Nevada points to an alarming phenomenon in which those involved in emotional and acrimonious cases are taking their frustrations out on the judges.

On Monday Nevada Family Court Judge Chuck Weller was shot in his office by a man he dealt with in a divorce case.

The suspect, Darren Mack, is a multimillionaire father of three whose relatives say was deeply upset over Weller's rulings in his divorce case.

"He felt that the financial remuneration that was awarded to his wife was totally unjust and unfair," said Mack's cousin, Jeff Donner.

Mack allegedly used a sniper's rifle to fire through the window of the judge's third-floor office window, shooting Weller in the chest. He was hospitalized and survived the shooting.

Later that day Mack's estranged wife, Charla Mack, was found dead in the garage of her home. Darren Mack was also charged for the slaying and remains a fugitive.

New Protections for Family Court Judges

Mack's campaign against Weller began months in advance, according to the judge's spokesman, who said the suspect found plenty of company in his frustrations on the Internet.

One blogger called the judge a terrorist. Another complained he was a bully and abusive. A third compared him to Hitler.

Family court judges across the country said, sadly, that such venom is not unusual. These courts are actually considered by many judges to be even more volatile than criminal courts because the plaintiffs have so much at stake -- custody, visitation rights, money -- and emotions are often at the breaking point.

"We draw the ire of some people who are incapable of thinking objectively because the pressures of divorce and custody matters sometimes drive them to the bitter end," said Judge Charles McGee.

In New York state, every family courthouse is now equipped with a day care center. The policy was put in place after a Brooklyn parole officer shot and killed his estranged wife in a courthouse hallway

Appendix A

packed with children.

"We terminate parental rights sometimes, which is the equivalent of the death penalty in civil courts. That's not something that goes down very easy," said Judge Stephen Rubin, president of the National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges.

Many of the nation's courthouses have been made more secure since Sept. 11, 2001. Monday's shooting prompted the introduction of legislation to replace courthouse windows with bulletproof glass.

As for Weller, he survived the shooting but went straight from the hospital into hiding, where he's likely to remain until his attacker is caught.

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Appendix A

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Newsroom

Press Release of Senator Reid

REID PUSHES FOR PASSAGE OF COURTHOUSE SECURITY AMENDMENT

Move aims to prevent shootings like that of Judge Chuck Weller

Wednesday, June 14, 2006

Washington, D.C. – Following up on his speech yesterday, U.S. Senator Harry Reid of is renewing his efforts to improve courthouse security by introducing the Court Security an amendment to the Defense Authorization Bill.

Reid offered the Court Security Amendment tonight in effort to move the process forward after he paid tribute to Washoe County District Court Judge Chuck Weller in a spee the Senate floor. In that speech, he called for passage of a Senate measure that would federal grants for security improvements at courthouses -- such as adding bullet-proof w or hiring additional security personnel.

Reid continues to do all that he can to ensure the measure will move as fast as possible he submitted the following statement in the Congressional Record:

Introduction of Court Security Amendment to S. 2766 Defense Authorization

Wednesday, June 14, 2006

MR. REID. Mr. President, I spoke yesterday about the terrible Courthouse shooting that place in Reno on Monday, and what we can do in the Senate to help prevent such incid Today, in order to move that process forward, I rise to offer the text of Court Security Improvement Act of 2005 as an amendment to the Defense Authorization bill.

First, however, I would like to take a moment to update everyone on Judge Chuck Welle condition. Judge Weller, if you remember, was hit by a sniper's bullet while standing in t window of his Reno office.

According to the latest reports, the judge is in "good spirits" and "out of the woods." The seems to have missed his vital organs, and for that, we all thank God.

Now that Judge Weller seems to be stabilizing, it is incumbent on all of us to do whatev takes to prevent similar violence... whether in Reno or any other city. Judges like Chuck their clerks and jurors must be free to serve without threats to their lives.

The amendment I'm introducing today would improve protections for both federal and st judges. I want to thank Senators Specter and Leahy for all the work they've done in putt legislation together, and for co-sponsoring it today.

Appendix A

On the federal level, the amendment allows for better cooperation between the judiciary and the U.S. Marshall Service. It also puts in place strong measures to protect the personal information of those who sit on the federal bench.

At the state level, the amendment would authorize federal grants to improve security at courts, like the Reno Family Court where Judge Weller works.

These federal grants might be used by states to strengthen courthouse infrastructure, such as adding bullet-proof windows, or it might be used to hire additional security personnel in the courthouse. In the wake of Monday's shooting, I know the City of Reno and the Washoe County Commission are looking into both of these steps, and I also know they could use our help.

States like Nevada should always take the lead in protecting their own judicial officers, but we can and should make the federal government a better, stronger partner.

Mr. President, in our country, we have 32,000 State and local court judges and approximately 2,400 Federal judges. Our democracy depends on these men and women. They must be able to do their jobs and uphold the law without fearing for their safety.

The time for us to act is now, not after another wake-up call.

The shooting of Chuck Weller is a terrible tragedy, but by passing this legislation, we can ensure at least some small measure of good results.

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Appendix A



THE ELY TIMES
Serving White Pine County Since 1920

County to spend \$100,000 on bailiffs for courthouse security

By *KENT HARPER*
Ely Times Editor

"Safety is the basic function of government," Terry Rubald told the White Pine County Commission Wednesday.

Rubald, Chief of the Nevada Department of Taxation Division of Assessment Standards, is a frequent participant in commission meetings since the Severe Financial Emergency was declared last summer.

She usually demands county spending stay within the approved budget. But Wednesday she said the county will have to pony up an additional \$100,000 to \$120,000 before July.

She left it to Seventh Judicial Judge Dan L. Papez to explain why.

Papez said the county must provide the money to pay the salary and benefits for two courthouse bailiffs.

"This is not a new issue," Judge Papez said. "I've appeared before this board on the issue many times."

The judge said that in the past he has not insisted on the bailiff positions because he understood about the tight county budget.

But information he received within the past 10 days has convinced him that security at the courthouse must be improved immediately. He said the allegations he has heard are under investigation and so he would not go into any details.

"That's a huge, intolerable risk I cannot allow to continue," he told the commission.

Judge Papez also cited the June 12 sniper shooting of Family Court Judge Chuck Weller in Reno, who was shot as he stood at a third-story window. That shooting resulted from a bitter divorce case, not an unusual occurrence at any courthouse.

He also reminded the commission that some of Nevada's most hardened criminals are incarcerated at Ely State Prison and are brought to the courthouse for much of their post-conviction legal actions.

Security at the courthouse now is haphazard at best and non-existent the majority of the time. While there is a metal detector at the top of the stairs on the second floor, all of the courthouse doors stay unlocked throughout the day. And people who take the elevator to the second floor avoid the single metal detector.

Judge Papez said the White Pine County Sheriff's Office now provides security. Deputies work as bailiffs inside the courtroom during trials. When trials are not in session, deputies are supposed to drop by the courthouse a few times per day.

But that doesn't happen all the time, the judge noted. The sheriff's office doesn't have the manpower to always pull deputies away from other duties.

"The time has come you have to pay it," the judge said.

The Taxation Department had suggested three methods of funding the bailiff positions: stop future payments to the Natural Resource fund; stop future payments to the EDC; or stop funding both.

Appendix A

"It's not my desire to hurt other people's budgets," he added.

Under the U.S. and Nevada Constitution, and the Separation of Powers precept, the judge has the responsibility and authority to provide security at the courthouse.

Up until now, he has been cooperative, but "I can't let this go on any longer."

Judge Papez said anyone who comes into the courthouse to do business in any of the offices is in jeopardy. Someone registering to vote or getting a marriage license or any of the employees could be taken as a hostage or harmed.

The judge plans to have all entrances to the courthouse locked during the day except for the main entrance. Anyone who enters through the main doors will pass through the metal detector now on the second floor. The only handicap access is at the side entrance near the clerk's office. That door too will be locked. But there will be a buzzer available. If someone needs access through that doorway, a bailiff will come and unlock the door. It will be locked again afterward.

The sheriff's office still will provide security inside the courtrooms.

Judge Papez noted the poor security at most rural courthouses. Adding the two bailiffs won't solve the problem. A judicial survey a few years ago found the White Pine Courthouse to have the worst security in the state, he added.

He said Gov. Kenny Guinn will again support the state funding a new judicial complex in White Pine.

The proposal to build an \$11 million facility failed to get a vote during the 2005 Nevada Legislature. Because of increased costs, the new bill will seek \$14 million.

Although, no one denied the security risks, several people spoke against using EDC funds for the bailiffs.

Rubald asked for the commissioners not to act yet on where to find the money to pay for the bailiffs. She said the Taxation Department wanted to look at more options.

But the commissioners did vote unanimously to hire the two bailiffs.

ISSUE

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FILED

NO. 04-044 HSD

Case No. 04-044 HSD

04 MAR 16 PM 54

IN THE JUSTICE COURT OF EAST FORK TOWNSHIP

COUNTY OF DOUGLAS, STATE OF NEVADA FORK JUSTICE COURT

BY [Signature]

RICHARD GLASSON,

Applicant,

vs.

CLIFFORD ROSS BEATTIE,

Adverse Party,

APPLICATION FOR ORDER AGAINST STALKING, AGGRAVATED STALKING, OR HARASSMENT (NRS 200.591)

STALKING - A person commits the crime of stalking when, without lawful authorization, that person willfully or maliciously engages in a course of conduct that would cause a reasonable person to feel terrorized, frightened, intimidated or harassed, and that actually causes the victim to feel terrorized, frightened, intimidated or harassed. (NRS 200.575 (1))

AGGRAVATED STALKING - A person commits the crime of aggravated stalking when that person commits the crime of stalking and, in conjunction therewith, threatens the person with the intent to cause him to be placed in reasonable fear of death or substantial bodily harm. (NRS 200.575 (2))

HARASSMENT - A person commits the crime of harassment when (a) that person, without lawful authority, knowingly threatens: (1) to cause bodily injury in the future to the person threatened or to any other person; (2) to cause physical damage to the property of another person; (3) to subject the person threatened or any other person to physical confinement or restraint; or (4) to do any act which is intended to substantially harm the person threatened or any other person with respect to his physical or mental health or safety; and (b) the person by words or conduct places the person receiving the threat in reasonable fear that the threat will be carried out. (NRS 200.571)

(PLEASE PRINT CLEARLY)

I am applying for protection for (check all that apply):

[X] Myself [X] On behalf of another person(s)

Applicant states the following facts under penalty of perjury:

I reasonably believe that the Adverse Party has committed and/or is committing the crime of stalking, aggravated stalking or harassment as defined above. The acts occurred as follows:

PLEASE PRINT CLEARLY

1 (NOTE: BE SPECIFIC AS TO WHO COMMITTED WHAT ACT OR ACTS, AGAINST WHOM, WHEN,
2 WHERE, WHETHER COMMITTED OR THREATENED; INDICATE APPROXIMATE DATE(S) AND
3 LOCATION(S).)

3 On 3-12-04 from a very reliable source it was related to me that: Mr.
4 Beattie had stated that he "is going to kill Judge Glasson"; Mr. Beattie has
5 made this statement to his brother; Mr. Beattie is in possession of or has
6 access to firearms; Mr. Beattie continues to batter and/or intimidate his
7 roommate, Kelly Makara; Mr. Beattie is not rational and is highly volatile
8 when drinking or using drugs.

9 (NOTE: PLEASE DO NOT WRITE ON THE BACK OF ANY PAGES; ASK FOR ADDITIONAL PAGES)

10 [] Check if you use additional pages

11 This matter does not have to be reported to law enforcement; however, has a report ever been
12 filed? [X] Yes [] No

13 If yes, approximate date(s): March 13, 2004.

14 Name of law enforcement agency: DCSO.

15 Case number if known: See attached Officer/Building Safety Notice.

16 (NOTE: IT IS NOT NECESSARY TO FILE A LAW ENFORCEMENT REPORT, BUT IF
17 YOU HAVE ONE AVAILABLE, PLEASE BRING IT TO THE COURT HEARING.)

18	1.	a)	Applicant's Name	Date of Birth
19			GLASSON RICHARD BROOKS	05/13/1953
20			(Last) (First) (Middle)	

21 b) Provide names below of those for whom you are seeking protection, including
22 yourself, minors or household members that need this protection. Indicate the
23 relationships of all persons listed to yourself and to the Adverse Party (e.g., spouse,
24 intimate partner, friend, roommate, neighbor, relative, acquaintance, co-worker,
25 stranger):

Appendix A

PLEASE PRINT CLEARLY

NAME	DATE OF BIRTH	RELATIONSHIP TO APPLICANT	RELATIONSHIP TO ADVERSE PARTY
Richard Glasson	Adult	Self	Sentencing Judge Re: Adverse Party*
Susan Ford Glasson	Adult	Spouse	none
Karen Giovannoni	Adult	Chief Deputy Clerk	Court Clerk*
Virginia Cook	Adult	Deputy Clerk	Court Clerk*
Marie Robinette	Adult	Deputy Clerk	Court Clerk*
Donna Domnick	Adult	Deputy Clerk	Court Clerk*
Suzanne Rowe	Adult	Court Reporter	Court's Reporter*

(NOTE: YOUR APPLICATION WILL NOT BE DENIED BASED UPON A PARTICULAR RELATIONSHIP. HOWEVER, DEPENDING UPON YOUR RELATIONSHIP, YOU MAY ALSO BE ENTITLED TO AN ORDER OF PROTECTION AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE PURSUANT TO NRS CHAPTER 33.)

2. Have you and the Adverse Party ever lived together? Yes No
If so, for how long? _____

3. Are you living together now? Yes No

4. Date of separation (if applicable): n/a

5. Are there children involved? Yes No If so, how are they involved?

6. Has the Adverse Party ever been involved in any other relevant court actions (e.g.,
eviction, divorce, custody, protection order, etc.)?

Yes No If yes, please explain

Appendix A

PLEASE PRINT CLEARLY

1 I am the Justice Court Judge of Tahoe Township, the jurisdiction wherein the
2 Adverse Party resides. The Adverse party has several cases in our Court, two
3 of which still remain open, as follows:

4 In case # 02-0435 Mr. Beattie was sentenced for 2nd offense DUI, and elected
5 treatment per NRS 484.3794. The 10-day mandatory sentence was therefore
6 suspended, upon conditions. Mr. Beattie failed to complete the conditions,
7 and the jail time was imposed and served out. Mr. Beattie still owes \$400 in
8 fines, due by 9-27-04. The last Court event in this file occurred on 11-21-
9 03. Mr. Beattie was represented by attorney Bill Cole.

10 In case #03-0269 Mr. Beattie was sentenced to 90 days in jail for domestic
11 battery against 13-year-old A.M. Because Mr. Beattie had his suspended
12 sentence revoked on case #02-0435 on the same date that he was sentenced in
13 this domestic battery case, this 90 day sentence was suspended upon
14 conditions. Later, Mr. Beattie violated the conditions of suspension and the
15 90 days were imposed, with Mr. Beattie being allowed to serve all or a
16 portion of the sentence in residential treatment. If Mr. Beattie completed
17 the treatment, the balance of the sentence would be resuspended. Mr. Beattie
18 refused to attend any treatment and elected to serve out the 90 days in jail.
19 The last Court event in this file occurred on 12-09-03. Mr. Beattie was
20 represented by attorney Bill Cole.

21 7. Residence(s) where protection is needed:

22 CONFIDENTIAL (If confidential, do NOT write address here) or,

23 If not confidential, list address, city, and state and zip code:
24
25

8. Place(s) of employment where protection is needed:

PLEASE PRINT CLEARLY

1 [] CONFIDENTIAL, *(If confidential, do NOT write it here)*; or,

2 [X] If not confidential, list address, city, and state and zip code:

3 Douglas County Administration Building, Courthouse and Parking facility at Lake Tahoe,
4 175 Highway 50, Stateline, NV 89449. In the event Mr. Beattie is required by law to
5 attend at the Tahoe Township Justice Court, he should not be off of the Highway right of
6 way of U.S. 50 except for a period of time 15 minutes before and 15 minutes after any
7 scheduled Court appearance.

8 9. Location of school(s) where protection is needed:

9 [] CONFIDENTIAL, *(If confidential, do NOT write it here)* or,

10 [] If not confidential, list address, city, and state and zip code:

11

12

13

14 10. Other specific locations frequented where protection is needed:

15 [] CONFIDENTIAL *(If confidential, do NOT write address here)* or,

16 [X] If not confidential, list address, city, and state and zip code:

17 Any and all streets, residential and forest areas off of the State Route 207 right-of way
18 (Kingsbury Grade) below the Charthouse Restaurant and above Highway 50; U.S. Post
19 Office at Round Hill.

20 11. Are there other persons that the Adverse Party should be directed not to contact?

21 [X] Yes [] No

22 If yes, please name the individuals and explain why: Susan Glasson, spouse of
23 Applicant, and Karen Giovannoni*, Virginia Cook*, Marie Robinette*, Donna Domnick*
24 and Suzanne Rowe*, Applicant's co-workers, as any threat to harm the applicant
25 constitutes a danger to those who associate with the intended victim.

12. Are there any other safety concerns that the court should know (e.g., firearms, etc.)?

PLEASE PRINT CLEARLY

1 [X] Yes [] No

2 If yes, please briefly explain: Applicant has been informed that the Adverse Party possesses or
3 has access to firearms, is very volatile and irrational, especially when intoxicated. The adverse
4 party has been diagnosed as an alcoholic or an abuser of drugs.

5 RELIEF REQUESTED

6 THEREFORE, I REQUEST that a Temporary Order be issued against the Adverse Party
7 requiring the Adverse Party to refrain from contacting, intimidating, threatening or otherwise
8 interfering with me and/or other persons identified in this application, either directly or through
9 an agent.

10 I FURTHER REQUEST that the Court require the Adverse Party to stay away from the
11 following places (check all that apply):

12 [X] Residence(s) as described above,

13 [X] Place(s) of employment as described above.

14 [] School(s) as described above.

15 [x] Other location(s) frequented as described above.

17 I FURTHER REQUEST that this Court set a hearing date for an Extended Order.

18 [x] Yes [] No

20 (NOTE: IF GRANTED AND SERVED, A TEMPORARY ORDER MAY BE ENFORCED FOR
21 UP TO 30 DAYS, EXCEPT THAT IF AN EXTENDED ORDER IS REQUESTED, THE
22 TEMPORARY ORDER REMAINS IN EFFECT UNTIL THE HEARING ON THE EXTENDED
23 ORDER IS HELD BY THE COURT. IF GRANTED AND SERVED, AN EXTENDED ORDER
24 MAY BE ENFORCED FOR UP TO ONE YEAR.)


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PLEASE PRINT CLEARLY

DECLARATION
(NRS 53.045)

I DECLARE UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY UNDER THE LAW OF THE STATE OF NEVADA THAT: (1) I AM THE APPLICANT HEREIN, (2) I HAVE READ THE STATEMENTS CONTAINED HEREIN OR HAVE HAD THEM READ TO ME, (3) I BELIEVE THESE STATEMENTS TO BE TRUE, AND (4) THE REQUESTED ORDER IS NEEDED.

Dated: 3/16/04



APPLICANT'S SIGNATURE

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CONTINUATION PAGE

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APPLICANT'S NAME: Richard Glasson

(NOTE: BE SPECIFIC AS TO WHO COMMITTED WHAT ACT OR ACTS, AGAINST WHOM, WHEN, WHERE, WHETHER COMMITTED OR THREATENED; INDICATE APPROXIMATE DATE(S) AND LOCATION(S).)

CONTINUED FROM PAGE 2: See "Officer Building Safety" Notice.

THIS FORM SHALL BE INCORPORATED BY REFERENCE TO THE ATTACHED APPLICATION.

02/02/2007 10:05 7757829947

EF JUSTICE COURT

PAGE 02/05

Appendix A

Sheriff

**CERTIFIED
COPY**

FILED
NO. 04-044 HSO

1 Case No. 04-044 HSO _____
2 Department No.

04 MAR 17 10:54

3
4 **IN THE JUSTICE COURT OF EAST FORK TOWNSHIP**
5 **COUNTY OF DOUGLAS, STATE OF NEVADA**
6

7 RICHARD GLASSON,)
8 Applicant,)
9 vs.)
10 CLIFFORD ROSS BEATTIE,)
11 Adverse Party.)

TEMPORARY ORDER AGAINST
STALKING, AGGRAVATED
STALKING OR HARASSMENT
(NRS 200.591)

12 **YOU, THE ADVERSE PARTY, ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED** that **ANY INTENTIONAL**
13 **VIOLATION OF THIS ORDER IS A CRIMINAL VIOLATION** and can result in your immediate
14 arrest or issuance of an arrest warrant. A violation of a Temporary Order Against Stalking,
15 Aggravated Stalking or Harassment is a gross misdemeanor which is punishable by
16 imprisonment in the county jail for not more than one (1) year, or by a fine of not more than
17 \$2,000.00, or by both fine and imprisonment.

18 **YOU ARE FURTHER NOTIFIED** that you **CAN BE ARRESTED** even if the person who
19 obtained the Order invites or allows you to contact them. You have the *sole responsibility* to
20 avoid or refrain from violating the terms of this Order. Only the Court can change the Order
21 upon written application.

This Order meets the Full Faith and Credit provisions of the Violence Against Women Act and is enforceable in all 50 states, the District of Columbia, U.S. Territories and Indian Nations. All other courts and law enforcement with jurisdiction within the United States and all Indian Nations shall give full faith and credit to this Order pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2265.

Violation of the Order may subject you to federal charges and punishment pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2261(a)(1) and (2) and 2262(a)(1) and (2).

Appendix A

1 commit the offense(s) of stalking, aggravated stalking, or harassment, and good
2 cause appearing therefore, **YOU ARE HEREBY ORDERED** as follows:

3 **YOU ARE PROHIBITED**, either directly or through an agent, from contacting,
4 intimidating, using, attempting to use, or threatening the use of physical force, or
5 otherwise interfering in any way with the Applicant and/or the following protected
6 parties: **Susan Ford Glasson, Karen Giovannoni, Virginia Cook, Marie Robinette,**
7 **Donna Domnick and Suzanne Rowe** including, but not limited to, in person, by
8 telephone, through the mail, through electronic mail (e-mail), facsimile, or through

9 1. **YOU ARE ORDERED** to stay away from the following places: **Any and**
10 **all streets, residential and forest areas off the State Route 207 right-of way**
11 **(Kingsbury Grade) below the Charthouse Restaurant and above Highway 50;**
12 **U.S. Post Office at Round Hill.**

13 **Residence(s) of Applicant: Listed as Confidential**

14 **Place(s) of Employment (Name & location): Douglas County Administration Building,**
15 **Courthouse and Parking Facility at Lake Tahoe, 175 Highway 50, Stateline, Nevada 89449. In**
16 **the event Mr. Beattie is required by law to attend at the Tahoe Township Justice Court, he**
should not be off the Highway right of way of U.S. 50 except for a period of time 15 minutes
before and 15 minutes after any scheduled Court appearance.

17 2. **YOU ARE FURTHER ORDERED:** _____
18 _____
19 _____
20 _____
21 _____

Appendix A

1 If an application for an extended order is filed within the effective period of this
2 temporary order, this temporary order will remain in effect until the hearing on
3 an extended order is held.

4 4. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall transmit a
5 copy of this Order together with the application, to the Douglas County Sheriff's
6 Office and/or the Office of the Constable and/or any other appropriate law
7 enforcement agency.

8 5. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that said law enforcement agency will
9 promptly attempt to serve this Order upon the Adverse Party, without charge to the
10 Applicant, and upon service file return of service with the Court by the end of the next
11 business day after service is made.

12
13 **IT IS FURTHER ORDERED** that a hearing on the issuance of an
14 Extended Order is set in Department ____ at: _____ m. on the
15 _____ day of _____, 20____.
16 **THIS TEMPORARY ORDER REMAINS EFFECTIVE UNTIL THE**
17 **HEARING ON THE EXTENDED ORDER HAS BEEN HELD. YOU and**
18 **YOUR witnesses may approach and enter the courthouse to attend the**
19 **hearing but must stay away from Applicant and Applicant's witnesses while**
20 **approaching, entering and within the courthouse.**

21 **NOTICE TO LAW ENFORCEMENT**


Any law enforcement officer, with or without a warrant, may arrest and

Appendix A

1 order. This arrest may occur regardless of whether the violation occurred in
2 the officer's presence.

3 Any law enforcement agency in this state may enforce a court order
4 issued pursuant to NRS 200.591, without regard to the county in which the
5 order is issued.

6 IT IS SO ORDERED this 17 day of MARCH, 2004.

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9 JUSTICE OF THE PEACE

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The Document to which this certificate
is attached is a full, true and correct
copy of the original document as filed
in my office

March 17, 2004
Date: Clerk of the East Fork Justice Court
County of Douglas, State of Nevada
(Seal)
By: M. B...
Deputy Clerk

ORDER FOR PROTECTION RETURN OF SERVICE

Case No. 04-044 HSO
Dept. No. _____

FILED

NO. 04-444

IN THE JUSTICE COURT OF
EAST FORK TOWNSHIP,
COUNTY OF DOUGLAS,
STATE OF NEVADA

RICHARD GLASSON
(Name) Applicant,

vs.

CLIFFORD BEATTIE
(Name) Adverse Party.

EAST FORK JUSTICE COURT

3/23/04 MB

TYPE OF ORDER SERVED

I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT ON 3-23-04 I RECEIVED:
(Date)

- Emergency Temporary Order for Protection
- Temporary Order for Protection
- Extended Order for Protection
- Notice for Hearing to Extend, Modify or Dissolve the Order for Protection
- Order for Hearing to Extend, Modify or Dissolve the Order for Protection
- Foreign Order (describe in terms of State/County/City & Court Issued from) _____
- Temporary Stalking/Harassment Order
- Extended Stalking/Harassment Order
- Motion/Notice of Hearing _____

Other (describe): _____

I FURTHER CERTIFY THAT I: Deputy M. Helms #288

PERSONALLY SERVED the same upon the Adverse Party/Applicant, Clifford Beattie
(Name)

on 3-23-04, at 1810, who identified him/herself by or with.
(Date) (Time)

visual / verbal, at (location): 383 Sherman Dr.
(Type of Identification)

City of Stateline, County of Douglas, State of Nevada.

ATTEMPTED TO SERVE same on: _____, _____, and _____
The Adverse Party/Applicant was not found and service was NOT affected.

INFORMED THE ADVERSE PARTY of the specific terms and conditions of the order and that a violation of the order will result in his/her arrest and the location of the court that issued the order and the hours during which he/she may obtain a copy of the order.

SIGNATURE (Officer/Person Serving Order/ID Number)

M Helms #288

Print Name (Officer/Person Serving Order)

M Helms #288

Print Address (Officer/Person Serving Order)

P.O. Box 218
Minden NV 89423

**NEVADA STATEWIDE COURT SECURITY SURVEY ANALYSIS
(ONE-PAGE SURVEY)
March 2006**

Prepared by Beth Mammen, AOC

ABOUT THE SURVEY

The one-page survey was completed by a selected group of 15 court facilities, i.e., those represented by the members of the Statewide Court Security Task Force. A list of the facilities responding can be found in Appendix A (attached).

Results of the survey have been divided into two categories: (1) Courts that are located in major metropolitan cities and (2) courts that are located in rural areas. Of Nevada's 70 court facilities, approximately 77 percent of them are classified as rural.

Out of the 54 rural courts in Nevada, 8 were surveyed, approximately 15 percent. Seven of Nevada's urban courts, approximately 44 percent, were surveyed.

Nevada Courts – Urban & Rural

Courts	Number	Percent	Number Surveyed	Percent Surveyed
Rural	54	77	8	15
Urban	16	23	7	44

Ten questions concerning building security, policies, training and other topics were included in the survey; responses to each question for the two categories of courts are detailed below.

Since a relatively small percentage of rural courts were included in the survey, the results included herein may or may not be applicable to Nevada's rural courts as a whole. The responses received to the more detailed, comprehensive questionnaire sent to all courts in conjunction with this one-page survey may be a more reliable indication of the status of court security in the rural areas.

HOW TO READ THE SURVEY RESULTS

The first column of the tables below each question details the number of facilities responding with a particular answer. For example, in question #1, three rural facilities responded that their security program included the entire building, two responded that their security program included just one floor or courtroom, and three responded that their program included neither.

Appendix B

The second column in each table reflects the calculated percentage of courts responding to the question similarly. In question #1, the three rural facilities indicating their security program included the entire building represents 38 percent of rural courts surveyed. The two (2) facilities that indicated their security program included just one floor or courtroom represents 25 percent of rural courts surveyed. The three (3) that responded their program included neither represents the remaining 38 percent surveyed.

SURVEY RESULTS

Question #1: Does your security program include the entire building(s) or are you providing protection for only one floor or courtroom(s)?

Courts	Entire Building		One Floor/Courtroom		Neither	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	3	38	2	25	3	38
Urban	6	86	1	14	0	0

Question #2: Do you presently monitor ingress/egress of people entering your building at a controlled entry point(s)?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	3	38	5	63
Urban	6	86	1	14

Question #3: What types of security equipment are you currently using to monitor people entering your building(s)?

Courts	Locked Areas		Weapons/Metal Detector		X-ray	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	1	13	3	38	1	13
Urban	1	14	6	86	5	71

Courts	Video Cameras		Hand-held wands		None	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	0	0	1	13	5	63
Urban	3	43	5	71	0	0

Appendix B

Question #4: Does your agency have a *weapons-free* policy, which restricts all weapons with the exception of court officers from being carried in your building(s)?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	5	63	3	38
Urban	3	43	4	57

Question #5: Do you use private security to supplement your court officers?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	0	0	8	100
Urban	4	57	3	43

Question #6: Do you receive annual in-service training and if so, does it include weapon retention?

Courts	Yes		No		Unknown	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	3	38	4	50	1	12
Urban	7	100	0	0	0	0

Question #7: Do you presently offer security awareness training to court support personnel?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	1	13	7	88
Urban	5	71	2	29

Appendix B

Question #8: Who receives, sorts, and delivers the mail in your building(s)?

Courts	Clerks		Mailroom		Court Staff	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	3	38	2	25	0	0
Urban	2	29	3	43	4	57

Courts	Police Dept. Administration		Post Office		D.A.'s Office Personnel	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	1	13	1	13	1	13
Urban	0	0	0	0	0	0

Question #9: Does your agency have written *desk-top* procedures for all emergencies that could possibly occur in your building(s)?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	0	0	8	100
Urban	6	86	1	14

Question #10: Does your agency have a court security committee?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	0	0	8	100
Urban	6	86	1	14

Appendix A

Courts Responding to One-Page Survey
March 2006

1. Eastline Justice Court/West Wendover Municipal Court (*Rural*)
2. Eighth Judicial District Court – Family Division (*Urban*)
3. Esmeralda County Courthouse (Goldfield) (*Rural*)
4. Fourth Judicial District Court (Elko) (*Rural*)
5. Las Vegas Municipal Court (*Urban*)
6. Mesquite Municipal Court (*Rural*)
7. Ninth Judicial District Court (Minden) (*Rural*)
8. North Las Vegas Municipal Court (*Urban*)
9. Pahrump Justice Court (*Rural*)
10. Regional Justice Center (Las Vegas) (*Urban*)
11. Reno Municipal Court (*Urban*)
12. Second Judicial District Court & Reno Justice Court (*Urban*)
13. Seventh Judicial District Court (Ely) (*Rural*)
14. Sparks Justice Court (*Urban*)
15. Third Judicial District Court (Yerington) (*Rural*)

**NEVADA STATEWIDE COURT SECURITY SURVEY ANALYSIS
(MULTI-PAGE SURVEY)
March 2006**

Prepared by Beth Mammen, AOC

ABOUT THE SURVEY

The multi-page survey was sent to all 70 court facilities in Nevada. Sixty-two facilities, approximately 90% of the courts, completed the survey. A list of the facilities responding can be found in Appendix B (attached).

Responses to the survey have been divided into two categories: (1) Responses from courts that are located in major metropolitan cities and (2) responses from courts that are located in rural areas. Of Nevada's 70 court facilities, approximately 77 percent of them are classified as rural.

Only four rural courts did not respond to the survey; all urban courts completed surveys.

The survey was comprised of 199 questions concerning a wide range of topics in the court security arena, i.e. physical security of the premises, access to the building and grounds, courthouse construction, power and alarm systems, communications, security procedures, etc. Responses to each question for the two categories of courts are detailed below.

Instances in which the response rates add up to less than 100% indicate that some courts did not respond to the question or the information was unknown by the respondent.

LIGHTING

Question #1: Is the entire perimeter lighted?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	19	41	27	59
Urban	16	100	0	0

Question #2: Are lights on all night?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	32	70	14	30
Urban	15	94	1	6

Appendix B

Question #3a: Lights are controlled automatically?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	28	61	10	22
Urban	15	94	1	6

Question #3b: Lights are controlled manually?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	11	24	15	33
Urban	2	13	4	25

Question #4: Are control switches inaccessible to unauthorized persons?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	22	48	20	43
Urban	13	81	2	13

Question #5: Do any exterior or perimeter lights have an auxiliary power source?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	12	26	28	61
Urban	9	56	5	31

Question #6a: Excluding parking areas, are the building grounds fully illuminated?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	11	24	27	59
Urban	8	50	1	6

Question #6b: Excluding parking areas, are the building grounds partially illuminated?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	31	67	3	7
Urban	8	50	1	6

Appendix B

Question #6c: Excluding parking areas, are the building grounds not illuminated?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	3	7	20	43
Urban	0	0	2	13

Question #7: Is the exterior of the building (particularly entry points) sufficiently lighted to discourage unlawful entry attempts or placement of explosive against the walls?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	20	43	25	54
Urban	12	75	4	25

Question #8: Are public areas (including parking spaces and walkways) sufficiently lighted to discourage attacks against persons or vehicles?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	15	33	31	67
Urban	11	69	5	31

PARKING AREAS

Question #1a: Is entry to and exit from parking areas controlled by guard?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	0	0	44	96
Urban	1	6	10	63

Question #1b: Is entry to and exit from parking areas controlled by an electronically operated gate?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	2	4	41	89
Urban	7	44	7	44

Appendix B

Question #1c: Is entry to and from parking areas controlled by “other” means? (Specify)*

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	0	0	32	70
Urban	2	13	5	31

***“Other” methods specified included key cards, judges and staff.*

Question #2: Is a reserved parking lot on courthouse grounds?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	13	28	33	72
Urban	11	69	5	31

Question #3: Do reserved parking spaces block access to the courthouse by fire or other emergency vehicles?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	3	7	37	80
Urban	0	0	16	100

Question #4: Is there reserved parking for judges?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	16	35	29	63
Urban	14	88	2	13

Question #5: Is there reserved parking for jurors and witnesses?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	0	0	45	98
Urban	0	0	15	94

Question #6: Does anyone else have reserved parking? (Specify.)*

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	17	37	29	63
Urban	15	94	1	6

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**Other reserved parking was indicated to exist for other court staff, JPO's, sheriffs, constables, under sheriffs, mayors, council members, administrative staff, clerks, bailiffs, and buildings and grounds personnel.*

Question #7: Are parking spaces reserved by name?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	2	4	42	91
Urban	0	0	16	100

Question #8: Are parking spaces reserved by number?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	2	4	42	91
Urban	8	50	8	50

Question #9: Is there direct access for judges from the garage to nonpublic elevators or restricted corridors?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	5	11	38	83
Urban	9	56	7	44

LANDSCAPING

Question #1: Do landscape features provide places for potential intruders to hide?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	21	46	25	54
Urban	8	50	8	50

Question #2: Are there items such as bricks, stones, or wooden fence pickets which could be used by intruders as weapons, missiles, or tools? If so, describe items.*

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	18	39	27	59
Urban	5	31	11	69

**Items described included rock, decorative bricks, general debris, fence pickets, garbage cans, ash trays, and wooden benches.*

DOORS, WINDOWS, OTHER OPENINGS

Question #1: Are all exterior doors properly equipped with cylinder locks, deadbolts, or quality padlocks and hasps?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	37	80	9	20
Urban	14	88	2	13

Question #2: Are doors with windows equipped with double-cylinder locks or quality padlocks?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	17	37	26	57
Urban	6	38	9	56

Question #3: Are all hinge pins internally located, welded, or otherwise treated to prevent easy removal?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	24	52	17	37
Urban	10	63	6	38

Question #4: Are all unused doors permanently locked?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	25	54	17	37
Urban	14	88	2	13

Question #5a: Are windows that could be used for entry protected with locking devices?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	18	39	19	41
Urban	6	38	5	31

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Question #5b: Are windows that could be used for entry protected with metal bars?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	1	2	35	76
Urban	0	0	10	63

Question #5c: Are windows that could be used for entry protected with mesh?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	3	7	34	74
Urban	2	13	9	56

Question #5d: Are windows that could be used for entry protected with intrusion alarms?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	2	4	35	76
Urban	3	19	8	50

Question #5e: Are windows that could be used for entry protected by other means? (Specify.)*

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	4	9	16	35
Urban	2	13	4	25

**Other means specified included windows that do not open, small sized windows, brick walls, and window locks.*

Question #6: Are openings to the roof (doors, skylights, etc.) securely fastened or locked from the inside?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	23	50	8	17
Urban	15	94	0	0

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Question #7: Is internal access to the roof controlled?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	24	52	12	26
Urban	14	88	0	0

Question #8a: Is the roof accessible by means of fire escape?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	4	9	36	78
Urban	1	6	13	81

Question #8b: Is the roof accessible by means of another building?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	7	15	33	72
Urban	1	6	14	88

Question #8c: Is the roof accessible by means of a pole or tree?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	11	24	29	63
Urban	0	0	14	88

Question #8d: Is the roof accessible by other means? (Specify.)*

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	4	9	14	30
Urban	4	25	5	31

**Other means specified included fences, internal stairways, ladders, and back walls.*

Question #9: Do roof openings have intrusion alarms?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	2	4	33	72
Urban	3	19	12	75

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Question #10: Are openings to the building (e.g. tunnels, utility and sewer manholes, culverts, service ports) properly secured?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	16	35	13	28
Urban	13	81	0	0

Question #11: Is a key-control system in effect?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	17	37	23	50
Urban	13	81	3	19

Question #12: Who is responsible for the key control system?

Responses varied widely and included the following entities:

- County Management and/or Public Works
- Buildings & Grounds Division or County Maintenance
- Court Administration and/or Court Operations
- City Clerk
- Judge
- Sheriff's Department
- Human Resources
- Senior Marshall
- Building Manager
- Each Entity
- Town Manager
- Dispatch
- Department Heads
- City Manager
- Town Council

Question #13: Are building entrance keys issued on a limited basis.

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	35	76	7	15
Urban	16	100	0	0

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Question #14: Are master keys kept securely locked and issued on a strictly controlled basis?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	30	65	11	24
Urban	14	88	2	13

Question #15: Is the number of entrance doors in use reduced to the minimum necessary?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	35	76	10	22
Urban	15	94	1	6

Question #16: Do judges and court officers have a private entrance to the building?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	15	33	31	67
Urban	12	75	4	25

CEILINGS, WALLS

Question #1: Do all walls extend to the ceiling?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	34	74	11	24
Urban	11	69	5	31

Question #2: Are drop or removable ceilings used in the courthouse?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	31	67	15	33
Urban	15	94	1	6

Question #3: Where?

Responses indicated drop or removable ceilings were used in various locations throughout the courthouse including chambers, hallways, courtrooms, basements, internal offices, breakrooms and in numerous cases, throughout the

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entire courthouse. Four courts reported that drop or removable ceilings were not used in holding cells.

EMERGENCY POWER SYSTEM

Question #1: Is the main power source dependable?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	38	83	8	17
Urban	15	94	1	6

Question #2: Is there a dependable auxiliary power source for emergencies?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	19	41	25	54
Urban	13	81	3	19

ALARMS

Question #1: Does the courthouse have an intrusion alarm system?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	6	13	38	83
Urban	10	63	5	31

Question #2: Is the system regularly tested?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	6	13	18	39
Urban	9	56	2	13

Question #3: How often?

Courts	Monthly	Quarterly	Bi-Annually	“Per County Code”	Unknown
Rural	2	1	1	1	0
Urban	4	1	1	0	1

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Question #4a: Does the system terminate in the sheriff's department?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	2	4	11	24
Urban	2	13	6	38

Question #4b: Does the system terminate in the local law enforcement office?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	3	7	10	22
Urban	2	13	6	38

Question #4c: Does the system terminate in the commercial control station?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	2	4	11	24
Urban	4	25	4	25

Question #4d: Does the system terminate in some other location? (Specify.)

Four urban courts reported that their alarms system terminated in a master or main control room on-site. One rural court reported that their system terminated "at the court".

Question #5: Is there an emergency power source for all alarms?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	9	20	11	24
Urban	10	63	1	6

FIRE PROTECTION

Question #1: Does the courthouse comply with local fire codes?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	35	76	5	11
Urban	16	100	0	0

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Question #2: Does the building have fire alarms?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	35	76	11	24
Urban	15	94	1	6

Question #3: Does the building have smoke detectors?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	29	63	17	37
Urban	15	94	1	6

Question #4: Does the building have a sprinkler system?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	18	39	25	54
Urban	15	94	1	6

Question #5: Does the building have fire extinguishers?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	44	96	2	4
Urban	16	100	0	0

ATTICS, BASEMENTS, CRAWL SPACES, AIR-CONDITIONING AND HEATING DUCTS

Question #1: Do basement doors have intrusion alarms?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	0	0	20	43
Urban	3	19	4	25

Question #2: Are basement doors securely fastened or locked when not in use?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	12	26	6	13
Urban	5	31	1	6

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Question #3: Are doors to basements, utility rooms, boiler rooms, crawl spaces, and attics locked when not in use?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	20	43	7	15
Urban	10	63	2	13

Question #4: Are crawl spaces secured from unauthorized entry?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	17	37	10	22
Urban	11	69	0	0

ELEVATORS

Question #1: Are private elevators provided for judges?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	0	0	21	46
Urban	6	38	7	44

Question #2: Are certain elevators used exclusively to move prisoners?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	4	9	13	28
Urban	8	50	5	31

Question #3: Are prisoner elevators marked "Not for Public Use"?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	2	4	11	24
Urban	3	19	9	56

Question #4: Are prisoner elevators controlled by key?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	4	9	10	22
Urban	7	44	4	25

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Question #5: Are prisoner elevators programmed to bypass floors?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	1	2	12	26
Urban	4	25	6	38

Question #6: Do elevators separate prisoners from escorts by metal bars or grilles?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	0	0	15	33
Urban	0	0	12	75

Question #7a: Are prisoner elevators equipped with alarms?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	4	9	9	20
Urban	5	31	6	38

Question #7b: Are prisoner elevators equipped with telephones?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	3	7	10	22
Urban	6	38	5	31

Question #7c: Are prisoner elevators equipped with CCTV?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	1	2	12	26
Urban	6	38	5	31

Question #7d: Are prisoner elevators equipped with “other” equipment?

One urban court reported that their elevator was in some way linked to the sheriff’s control room. One rural court reported that their prisoners were transported via public elevators. Another rural court reported that their prisoner elevators are equipped with audio monitors and another indicated their prisoner elevators contained a bell alarm.

STORAGE AREAS FOR ARMS AND DANGEROUS SUBSTANCES

Question #1a: Are weapons stored in the courthouse?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	8	17	25	54
Urban	14	88	2	13

Question #1b: Is ammunition stored in the courthouse?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	7	15	26	57
Urban	13	81	3	19

Question #1c: Is tear gas stored in the courthouse?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	5	11	28	61
Urban	1	6	12	75

Question #1d: What “other” dangerous substances are stored in the courthouse?

Two urban courts reported that tasers and related equipment were stored in their courthouses. Two rural courts reported that other dangerous substances such as chemicals and drugs, as evidence, were stored on-site. One rural court reported that the adjacent sheriff’s office housed an evidence vault but its content was unknown.

COMMUNICATIONS

Question #1: Are communications adequate?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	20	43	18	39
Urban	13	81	3	19

Question #2: If not, what is needed?

A wide variety of responses were received to this question. Two rural courts indicated their only means of communication was their phone systems; one of these also indicated an entirely new courthouse was needed. Five rural courts reported that panic alarms were non-existent or that additional alarms were

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needed. Two rural courts reported that additional modes of communication between floors or departments were needed. Six rural courts reported that radio, camera and public address systems were non-existent or not working or that additional radios were needed. One urban court indicated a need for a repeater.

Question #3a: Are telephone communications available in the courthouse?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	43	93	0	0
Urban	16	100	0	0

Question #3b: Are radio communications available in the courthouse?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	14	30	21	46
Urban	15	94	1	6

Question #3c: Are telegraph communications available in the courthouse?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	0	0	32	70
Urban	0	0	11	69

Question #3d: Are teletype communications available in the courthouse?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	4	9	29	63
Urban	3	19	9	56

Question #3e: Is a public address system available in the courthouse?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	4	9	28	61
Urban	6	38	7	44

Question #3f: Are "other" communications available in the courthouse? (Specify.)

Four rural courts and three urban courts recognized e-mail as another form of communications available. One rural court indicated cameras were installed. One urban court listed their panic alarm system as a communication mode and

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one rural court noted that their panic alarm system was linked to 911. One rural court reported private cell phones were available.

Question #4: Is there more than one communications system used exclusively by security personnel?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	7	15	31	67
Urban	7	44	9	56

In response to this question, one rural court reported they had no security personnel.

Question #5: Is there more than one communications system used exclusively for security purposes?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	2	4	35	76
Urban	7	44	9	56

Question #6: Who operates the public address system?

Two rural courts reported they had no public address system. Four courts (two rural and two urban) indicated bailiffs or security officers operated the P.A. system. One rural court stated dispatch sheriff personnel operated the P.A. system. One urban court reported that "staff" operated the P.A. system. Two courts (one rural and one urban) indicated their P.A. system was accessed through their phone system.

Question #7a: Do radios in the courthouse include a sheriff's base station?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	12	26	21	46
Urban	7	44	8	50

Question #7b: Do radios in the courthouse include a unit in security or bailiff's office netting to sheriff's base station?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	7	15	22	48
Urban	6	38	8	50

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Question #7c: Do radios in the courthouse include hand-held portables used by bailiffs?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	19	41	16	35
Urban	14	88	1	6

Question #7d: Do radios in the courthouse include hand-held portables used by security officers?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	7	15	23	50
Urban	8	50	4	25

Question #7e: Do radios in the courthouse include “other” additional equipment? (Specify.)

Seven courts reported that their radio system included different radio channels, a base station in the master control room, links to the local police department’ or dispatch personnel, a hand-held city network, or hand-held units used by sheriff’s officers acting as bailiffs.

Question #8a: Can radios net with local police?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	23	50	8	17
Urban	14	88	2	13

Question #8b: Can radios net with state police?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	14	30	15	33
Urban	2	13	13	81

Question #8c: Can radios net with other sheriff’s departments?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	13	28	13	28
Urban	6	38	8	50

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Question #8d: Can radios net with “other” entities? (Specify.)

One rural court reported their radios system linked to the fire department. Another indicated their system was linked to city personnel.

Question #9: Do base stations have an auxiliary power source?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	14	30	12	26
Urban	9	56	5	31

Question #10: Is there a duress code signal?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	8	17	24	52
Urban	10	63	6	38

Question #11: Do all telephones go through a building switchboard?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	9	20	31	67
Urban	3	19	12	75

PUBLIC AREAS (WAITING AREAS, RESTROOMS, HALLWAYS)

Question #1: Are public waiting rooms routinely searched?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	12	26	27	59
Urban	13	81	2	13

Question #2: Are waiting rooms next to courtrooms?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	28	61	10	22
Urban	11	69	3	19

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Question #3: Are drop or removable ceilings used in waiting rooms?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	20	43	18	39
Urban	4	25	10	63

Question #4: Are public restrooms routinely searched?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	12	26	33	72
Urban	8	50	8	50

Question #5: Are restrooms next to courtrooms?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	28	61	17	37
Urban	7	44	9	56

Question #6: Are drop or removable ceilings used in restrooms?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	14	30	32	70
Urban	3	19	12	75

Question #7: Do any trash receptacles allow easy concealment of contraband?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	33	72	12	26
Urban	10	63	6	38

Question #8: Are directions (directories and floor plans, if appropriate) clearly posted in all public areas?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	18	39	25	54
Urban	10	63	6	38

COURTHOUSE PROCEDURES

Question #1: Is there a security procedures manual for the courthouse?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	6	13	40	87
Urban	13	81	3	19

Question #2: Are all dates current and correct?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	5	11	31	67
Urban	11	69	5	31

Question #3: Are emergency plans current?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	11	24	28	61
Urban	13	81	3	19

Question #4: Is responsibility for declaring an emergency clearly fixed?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	11	24	30	65
Urban	11	69	5	31

Question #5: Is the authority and chain of command in emergency plans clear and accurate?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	14	30	25	54
Urban	11	69	5	31

Question #6: Are all emergency plans subject to periodic review and updating?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	11	24	30	65
Urban	12	75	4	25

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Question #7: Is there a procedure for handling medical emergencies involving the general public?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	16	35	26	57
Urban	14	88	2	13

Question #8: Is there a designated security officer for the courthouse?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	9	20	32	70
Urban	12	75	3	19

Question #9: Is there a security guard on duty after normal working hours?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	2	4	40	87
Urban	4	25	12	75

Question #10: If so, when and what hours?

Two courts (one rural, one urban) reported that their courthouses were manned 24 hours per day but did not indicate that coverage was 7 days per week. One urban court did indicate security was on-site 24/7. One urban court indicated security was manned 5 p.m.-7a.m. M-F and 24 hours Saturday, Sunday and holidays. One rural court reported coverage was provided Saturday 8 a.m.-4 p.m. and Sunday 8 a.m.-3 p.m. in the marriage bureau. Another urban court reported after hours coverage was provided M-F 5 p.m.-11 p.m.

Question #11: Is there a procedure for routine daily inspection of the courthouse?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	8	17	36	78
Urban	11	69	5	31

One urban court reported that the exterior of the courthouse is inspected but not the interior. One rural court indicated inspections are performed only on court days. And another rural court reported that inspections are performed only if the deputy has time.

COURTROOMS: LOCATIONS

Question #1: Do spaces above, below, and next to the courtroom present a security hazard?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	27	59	17	37
Urban	4	25	11	69

COURTROOMS: DOORS, WINDOWS, OTHER OPENINGS

Question #1: Are all unused doors secured?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	35	76	8	17
Urban	13	81	3	19

Question #2: Are the keys to all doors strictly controlled?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	27	59	16	35
Urban	14	88	2	13

One rural court indicated that county workers have access to doors.

Question #3a: Are there separate entrances into the courtroom for judges?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	27	59	17	37
Urban	15	94	1	6

Question #3b: Are there separate entrances into the courtroom for in-custody defendants?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	19	41	23	50
Urban	13	81	3	19

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Question #3c: Are there separate entrances into the courtroom for spectators?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	20	43	23	50
Urban	13	81	3	19

Question #4: Is the prisoner entry door far enough from the public seating area to prevent passing contraband?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	17	37	27	59
Urban	13	81	3	19

Question #5: Are all windows draped to obscure vision (particularly of the bench) from the outside?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	26	57	16	35
Urban	7	44	3	19

Six courts reported they had no windows in the courtroom.

COURTROOM: LIGHTS

Question #1: Is there emergency lighting?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	24	52	20	43
Urban	15	94	1	6

One rural court indicated exit door signs were the only emergency lighting in place.

Question #2: Are lights key controlled?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	3	7	41	89
Urban	4	25	11	69

COURTROOMS: FURNISHINGS

Question #1a: Are routine checks made of alarms?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	18	39	21	46
Urban	12	75	4	25

Question #1b: Are routine checks made of emergency lighting?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	20	43	20	43
Urban	12	75	4	25

Question #1c: Are routine checks made of metal detectors?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	14	30	23	50
Urban	16	100	0	0

Question #2: Are metal detectors available for use?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	22	48	23	50
Urban	16	100	0	0

Question #3: Is the bench reinforced to make it bullet resistant?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	15	33	28	61
Urban	11	69	4	25

Question #4: With what?

Ten courts indicated benches were reinforced with steel. Five courts reported benches were reinforced with Kevlar. Four courts reported their benches were reinforced with plastic, heavy metal or some type of armored plating. One court indicated only one of their courtroom's benches were reinforced but the material was unknown.

COURTROOMS: SECURITY PROCEDURES

Question #1a: Is there a policy for firearms to be carried into the courtroom by bailiffs?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	25	54	17	37
Urban	11	69	4	25

Question #1b: Is there a policy for firearms to be carried into the courtroom by law enforcement officer witnesses?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	27	59	18	39
Urban	12	75	4	25

Question #1c: Is there a policy for firearms to be carried into the courtroom by law enforcement officer spectators?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	23	50	18	39
Urban	12	75	4	25

Question #1d: Is there a policy for firearms to be carried into the courtroom by "other" individuals? (Specify.)

Two rural courts indicated policies were in place that allowed judges to carry firearms into the courtroom. One rural court reported that the D.A. was allowed to carry firearms into the courtroom and one urban court reported all law enforcement officers were permitted to carry firearms into the courtroom if proper i.d. was presented.

Question #2: Are bailiffs armed in the courtroom?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	32	70	7	15
Urban	15	94	0	0

Three rural courts indicated they did not have bailiffs. One rural court indicated they typically only have security officers on site during domestic violence proceedings.

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Question #3: Are bailiffs in uniform?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	25	54	11	24
Urban	13	81	2	13

Question #4: Are prisoners kept in restraints except when in the courtroom?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	37	80	7	15
Urban	15	94	1	6

One rural court indicated prisoners are not kept in restraints during jury trials or when ordered by the court. One rural and one urban court reported that prisoners were kept in restraints both inside and outside the courtroom.

Question #5a: Are there procedures for the emergency evacuation from the courtroom of prisoners?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	13	28	31	67
Urban	11	69	4	25

Question #5b: Are there procedures for the emergency evacuation from the courtroom of judges?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	13	28	31	67
Urban	12	75	4	25

Question #5c: Are there procedures for the emergency evacuation from the courtroom of jurors?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	8	17	33	72
Urban	9	56	4	25

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Question #6: Is there a procedure for a search screen operation for entry to courtroom?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	15	33	28	61
Urban	11	69	5	31

JUDGES' CHAMBERS AND RELATED OFFICES

Question #1: Are judges' chambers routinely searched for contraband by bailiffs or secretaries?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	6	13	38	83
Urban	6	38	10	63

One rural court reported that no judges chambers exist in the building.

Question #2: Is visitor access controlled by clerks, bailiffs, and/or secretaries?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	35	76	10	22
Urban	16	100	0	0

Question #3: Which?

(Table reflects numbers of courts reporting only, not percentages.)

Courts	Clerks	Secretaries/ Admin. Staff	Bailiffs/ Marshalls	Clerks & Bailiffs	Clerks & Secretaries	Bailiff, Secretaries & Clerks	Bailiffs & Secretaries
Rural	11	3	2	7	2	3	1
Urban	0	2	6	2	-	2	1

Question #4: Are the chambers routinely locked when the judge is not present?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	15	33	30	65
Urban	11	69	5	31

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Question #5a: When occupied by the judge, are the chambers' doors usually open?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	34	74	10	22
Urban	13	81	2	13

Question #5b: When occupied by the judge, are the chambers' doors usually closed?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	10	22	19	41
Urban	3	19	7	44

Question #5c: When occupied by the judge, are the chambers' doors usually locked?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	4	9	24	52
Urban	2	13	7	44

Question #6: Are judges routinely escorted between parking areas, chambers, and the courtroom?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	4	9	41	89
Urban	2	13	14	88

Question #7: Are judges escorted between parking area, chambers, and the courtroom during high-risk or sensitive trials?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	6	13	37	80
Urban	7	44	8	50

WITNESS WAITING ROOMS

Question #1: Are witness waiting rooms provided?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	14	30	31	67
Urban	11	69	4	25

Question #2: Is it possible to separate prosecution and defense witnesses?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	17	37	28	61
Urban	9	56	7	44

One rural court indicated prosecution and defense witnesses were separated by placing them at opposite ends of the hallway.

Question #3: Is public access to waiting rooms restricted?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	11	24	31	67
Urban	4	25	10	63

ATTORNEY-CLIENT CONFERENCE ROOMS

Question #1: Are rooms provided in the courthouse for attorney-client conferences?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	21	46	20	43
Urban	13	81	3	19

JURY DELIBERATION ROOM

Question #1: Is the jury deliberation room next to the courtroom or accessible through a controlled passage?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	17	37	12	26
Urban	9	56	0	0

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Question #2: Is the deliberation room routinely searched for contraband before occupancy?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	10	22	19	41
Urban	5	31	4	25

Question #3: Is the deliberation room locked when unoccupied?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	7	15	23	50
Urban	3	19	5	31

PRISONER RECEPTION AREA

Question #1: Are prisoners brought from jail to the reception area in the courthouse by:

Courts	Elevator	Stairway	Tunnel	Bridge	Vehicle	Foot
Rural	7	9	0	2	25	22
Urban	10	3	3	0	11	7

(Table reflects numbers of courts reporting only, not percentages.)

Question #2: Do prisoners brought from outside the courthouse enter through a:

Courts	Public Entrance	Private Entrance	Sally Port
Rural	27	16	9
Urban	1	10	10

(Table reflects numbers of courts reporting only, not percentages.)

Question #3: Is the entrance for prisoners out of public view?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	11	24	31	67
Urban	10	63	6	38

RESTRICTED AND SECURE PASSAGEWAYS

Question #1: Do prisoners walk through public areas when going from temporary holding areas to court?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	30	65	14	30
Urban	3	19	13	81

Question #2: Are restricted passages also used by judges and court staff?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	11	24	26	57
Urban	10	63	4	25

Question #3: Are Law Enforcement Officers required to leave guns in locked cabinets before entering restricted or secure passages?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	6	13	32	70
Urban	7	44	9	56

TEMPORARY HOLDING AREA

Question #1: Are temporary holding facilities located in the court building?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	24	52	20	43
Urban	15	94	1	6

Question #2: If not, where are prisoners held?

Courts	Attorney/Client Conference Room	Sheriff's Office or Substation	Hallway or Empty Office	Courtroom	Jail	Law Library or Other Office
Rural	1	3	5	5	2	-
Urban	-	-	-	-	-	1

(Table reflects numbers of courts reporting only, not percentages.)

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One rural district court reported that the temporary holding facility is located in the court building but it is not used because it's unsupervised.

Question #3: How many temporary holding cells are there?

Courts	None	One	Two	Three	Four	Five	Eight
Rural	4	7	9	1	-	1	1
Urban	1	1	4	-	1	4	-

(Table reflects numbers of courts reporting only, not percentages.)

One rural court responded that a temporary holding cell is provided for each courtroom plus a number of cells in the jail.

One rural court indicated that two holding cells exist in the court building but are never used because of the liability. "Prisoners are temporarily shackled and access/egress to and from the holding cells is via stairwell only. The sheriff's office does not possess adequate man-power to monitor inmates in the holding facilities at the same time court is in session."

One urban court responded that one holding cell is available for every two courtrooms and another responded that two were available for every court floor.

Question #4: Are prisoners moved from the reception area to a temporary holding area by a secure or restricted:

Courts	Elevator	Stairway	Tunnel	Bridge
Rural	4	5	1	0
Urban	10	2	3	0

(Table reflects numbers of courts reporting only, not percentages.)

Question #5: Do temporary holding cells open directly into:

Courts	The Court	A Restricted Passage
Rural	6	14
Urban	3	12

(Table reflects numbers of courts reporting only, not percentages.)

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Question #6: Is at least one holding cell equipped for audio and/or visual coverage of courtroom proceedings?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	6	13	28	61
Urban	3	19	13	81

Question #7: Are cells and areas used by prisoners routinely searched for contraband before and after use?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	20	43	15	33
Urban	16	100	0	0

Question #8: Are Law Enforcement Officers required to leave guns in locked cabinets before entering temporary holding areas?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	9	20	29	63
Urban	6	38	10	63

Question #9: Are prisoners kept in restraints except when in the cell?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	31	67	10	22
Urban	14	88	2	13

One urban court responded that prisoners are kept in restraints at all times, in and out of the cell.

Question #10: Are additional restraining devices available?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	22	48	20	43
Urban	15	94	1	6

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Question #11: Are there procedures for the emergency evacuation of prisoners from temporary holding areas?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	16	35	22	48
Urban	15	94	1	6

Question #12: Do security and transportation officers understand procedures for emergency evacuation of prisoners from temporary holding areas?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	21	46	17	37
Urban	14	88	1	6

PRISONER PROCEDURES

Question #1: Is there a procedure for handling the medical emergencies of prisoners?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	24	52	18	39
Urban	11	69	5	31

Question #2: Are cells and areas used by prisoners routinely searched?

Courts	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rural	27	59	13	28
Urban	16	100	0	0

OTHER COMMENTS

One urban court submitted the following observations:

“There is only one entrance into the courtroom. Prisoners are walked past the public in tiny foyer. The bailiff has his back to the entrance so his back is to the public, as they come in and out. We do not have a metal detector.

The clerk starts work at 6:30 a.m. and leaves at 4:30 p.m. Sometimes dark outside coming and going. No other employees are in or around the building at either time.”

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One rural court offered that their court “is a single wide trailer house 35 miles from county seat and jail.”

Nevada Supreme Court Personal Security Handbook

Background

In response to growing concerns regarding the safety and security of Nevada's courthouses, judges, and judicial employees, the Judicial Council approved the creation of a task force to assess security for courts in Nevada and to recommend minimum standards for security. The task force has made the creation of documents that can be used by all the courts in Nevada has become a priority, and thusly, the task force has created this handbook

Introduction

As members of the judicial family, we are all aware of the high profile cases of threats and violence against judges and court officials. While many of these incidents occur at the courthouse or workplace, it is important to remember that, according to the U.S. Marshals Service, most assaults on judges and court personnel occur away from work. That is why the Nevada Supreme Court has created this personal safety handbook, to help judges and other court employees and officials take sensible steps to ensure their safety and the safety of their families.

Tips for Individual, House, Home, and Family

Many of us already employ several of the safety measures listed below as common sense; however, all of our family members may not be cognizant of the need to be conscious of these important personal security practices. That is why it is our job to teach the members of our family, using age appropriate language and strategies, to be smart about personal safety.

At Home

- Restrict possession of house keys, and change or re-key the locks if keys are ever lost or stolen. Also, remember to change the locks when moving into a previously occupied home.
- Keep your doors and windows locked, including the garage, at night and even when you are home. Make sure the door from the garage into the house is equipped with a deadbolt.
- Destroy all envelopes, documents, and other materials that display personal information or information identifying your position when you dispose of them. A personal shredder is an excellent way to go about doing this.
- Get to know your neighbors.
- Arrange for an unlisted home telephone number so your address will not be as readily accessible.
- Check your phone number using google.com, and if your address (and a map) appear you can request that google.com remove it.

Be Suspicious

- Always be aware of your surroundings.

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- Be alert to utility crews and workmen who request access to your property, always check their identities, and call their employer if any questions persist.
- Be alert to peddlers and strangers.
- Refuse any unordered packages and any un-requested deliveries.
- Write down a description and the license numbers of any suspicious vehicles, and note descriptions of the occupants.
- Treat with suspicion any inquiries about the whereabouts or activities of family members.
- Report suspicious activities to local law enforcement.

Telephone Security

- Post emergency numbers by the phone, i.e. local law enforcement, hospitals, doctors, and the fire department.
- Do not answer your home phone with your name or official title.
- Report all threatening phone calls to local law enforcement.
- Consider using an answering machine to screen your phone calls, and do not include your name or phone number in your answering machine message.
- Have Caller ID for incoming calls, and use Caller ID Blocking to prevent your phone number from being displayed on outgoing calls.
- Avoid ordering services or products by telephone or online. If you do so, inform the merchant that you do not want your name and information given or sold to others.
- Women who live alone need to take special precautions to avoid identifying that fact on their answering machine. Also, only have your first initial and last name listed in the phone book.

When Going Out

- Avoid high risk areas, and vary your movements and routine as to not be predictable.
- Try to be inconspicuous when using public facilities and transportation. Do not wear clothing that calls attention to your official position. Your mannerisms and conduct should not attract attention.
- Avoid public demonstrations; do not be curious.

Special Precautions for Children

- Make sure your child knows his or her full name, address, and phone number.
- Instruct children to keep windows and doors locked and to never admit strangers.
- Teach children how to contact law enforcement or a trusted, responsible adult during an emergency.
- If children must be left home, keep the house well lit and let trusted neighbors know. Make sure your children know to never let a caller or someone at the door know that they are home alone.
- Know where you children are at all times.
- Tell your children to never leave home without notifying a parent where they are going and who they will be with.

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- Advise your children to only travel in pairs or groups.
- Tell your children to walk only on busy streets, avoid isolated areas, and never to walk next to the curb.
- Have your children only use play areas where recreational activities are supervised by responsible adults.
- Make sure your children know to refuse automobile rides from strangers, and to never accompany a stranger anywhere, even if the stranger claims mom or dad said it was okay.
- Advise your children to report anyone who attempts to molest or annoy them to a trusted adult.
- Monitor your children's online activity and make sure that children are taught to never post personal information like their address, telephone number, information on their parents' jobs, and the location of their school. Pay special attention to your children's use of "social networking" sites like www.myspace.com and www.friendster.com, and make sure your children know to talk with you immediately if they encounter anything online that makes them uncomfortable.

Special Precautions for Persons with Disabilities

- Know and avoid situations that could invite crime and/or assault, i.e. dark alleyways and unlit parking lots.
- Be aware of your surroundings in the office, on the street, and in other public places.
- Have a plan on what to do if you are confronted, and be realistic about your limitations.
- When waiting for public transportation, wait in a centralized location near other passengers.
- Always carry medical information about you that emergency responders will need to know.
- Always carry a cell phone capable of dialing 911.
- Never identify yourself as alone or disabled to anyone who calls.

Suspicious Packages or Mail

- Suspicious characteristics to look for include:
 - An unusual or unknown place of origin.
 - No return address.
 - Excessive postage.
 - Oily stains.
 - Wires or stings protruding from, or attached to, an item.
 - Incorrect spelling on label.
 - Odd looking or foreign-style handwriting or misspelled or incorrect addressing.
 - Different postmark and return address.
 - Strange odor, as many explosives smell like shoe polish or almonds.
 - Unusual package weight.
 - Uneven balance or odd shape.

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- Springiness in the top, bottom, or sides.
- Actions to Take
 - Never cut tape, stings, or wrapping on a suspicious package. Never immerse a suspicious package or letter in water, as either of these actions could cause an explosive device to detonate.
 - Never touch or move a suspicious package or letter.
 - Report any suspicious packages or mail to local law enforcement immediately.

Domestic Employees

- Conduct a thorough review of references and background.
- Inform domestic employees about their security responsibilities.
- Instruct domestic employees about emergency communication methods.

Security Precautions When You Are Away

- Maintain a lived-in look at your home.
- Stop deliveries, or arrange for them to be made to a neighbor or other trusted individual.
- Do not leave notes on doors.
- Do not hide keys outside.
- Use a timer to turn on lights at varied times and for varied intervals. Consider putting radios, TVs, etc., on timers as well.
- Hide valuables.
- Notify local law enforcement of your absence.
- Arrange for your mail to be secured during your absence, and stop delivery of your newspapers.
- Arrange for your yard to be maintained, have the lawn mowed or snow shoveled, while you are away.
- Ensure arrangements are made to make all payments on the regular schedule, and to take care of other routine duties while you are away.

Residential Security

- Exterior grounds:
 - Do not put your name on the outside of your residence or mailbox.
 - Make sure your home is well lit and use security (motion sensing) lighting.
 - Control vegetation and landscaping to eliminate hiding places and prevent obstruction of lines of sight. Trim trees at least 6 feet from the ground.
- Entrances and exits should have:
 - Solid doors that are at least 1 ¾ inches thick, with deadbolt locks.
 - One way peepholes in doors.
 - Bars and locks on skylights, windows, and sliding glass doors.
 - Equip glass doors and ground floor windows with interior release mechanisms that are not reachable from the outside.
- Interior Features:

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- An alarm system, with battery backup, serviced by a reputable company with round the clock monitoring and an intercom system. Make sure all out buildings are included when the security system is installed, and test the system on a monthly basis. Make sure signs or decals indicating the presence of an alarm system are prominently displayed.
- Fire extinguishers.
- Medical and first-aid equipment.
- Install smoke detectors, heat sensors, and carbon monoxide detectors; preferably the types that are hard wired with a battery backup.
- Have emergency escape plans in case of fire or other incident.
- Apartment and Condominium Security:
 - Avoid using the laundry facilities in your complex by yourself. Team up with another tenant.
 - Develop relationships with other tenants in your building. A well organized tenant association would be most helpful.
 - Do not buzz strangers into the building and do not allow strangers to enter the building when you are either entering or leaving.
 - Notify your building manager if you will be away for an extended period of time.

Identity Theft Protection

- Shred or destroy documents and paperwork with personal information before you discard the documents.
- Protect your social security number. Do not carry your social security card with you and do not have your social security number put on your checks or drivers license. Never give out your social security number unless absolutely necessary.
- Never provide personal information on the phone, via mail, or via the internet unless you are dealing with an entity you know and trust.
- Never click on links in unsolicited e-mails, or provide any personal or financial information unless you type in the web address. Make sure you use effective internet security measures that are up to date like anti-virus software, anti-spyware programs, and a personal firewall. Also, make frequent back-up copies of important data on a removable disk and store it in a safe place.
- Be particularly wary of “phishing” e-mails which may appear to come from your bank or another company with which you do business, and request you click on a link to “verify personal information.”
- Make sure passwords and pin numbers are not obvious or easily guessed.
- Do not leave mail in your mailbox overnight or on weekends.
- Put all outgoing mail in a secure U.S. Postal Service collection box.
- Keep all personal information and important documents in a secure location. Make sure you include information on all your accounts, including customer service numbers.
- Keep an eye out for signs your identity may have been stolen like bills that do not arrive, unexpected account statements or credit cards, denial of credit for no apparent reason, and calls or letters about purchases you did not make.

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- Monitor your credit report for suspicious activity. To obtain a free copy of your report go to www.annualcreditreport.com or call 1-877-322-8228.
- Carefully review all financial and account statements for suspicious or unauthorized activity.
- For more information on what to do if your identity is stolen, log on to www.ftc.gov/idtheft.

Campaigning Precautions

- Arrange for security at parades, dinners, and events.
- Take someone along when going door to door.
- Do not use your home address on campaign materials.
- Avoid riding in parades if there are not adequate crowd control and security measures in place.
- Considering controlling admission to campaign events with invitations or limited ticket sales.
- Do not personally post or remove campaign signs, if you can avoid it. Always take someone with you when putting up, or taking down, signs.
- Limit the number and size of campaign signs or stickers at your residence and on your vehicle.

Media and Communication Security

- Try to limit the amount of personal information regarding you that is available, take advantage of “opt out” policies and take care not to post information online.
- Do not provide the media with information regarding family activities or with the names, ages, etc. of children unless necessary.
- Do not tell the media about security measures you or your court have in place, and do not tell the media about any security deficiencies you or your court may be experiencing.
- Limit the amount of personal information you provide in public settings.
- Avoid using your official title in public when possible.
- Always attempt to address people in a calm and respectful manner.
- Avoid overindulging in the consumption of adult recreational beverages (alcoholic beverages) in public settings as this may compromise your best judgment and increase your vulnerability.
- Report any threats made to you or your family, whether made by phone, mail, e-mail, verbal communication, through an informant, or by any other means, to law enforcement immediately.

Tips on Ground Transportation Security

Traveling by motor vehicle can be one of the situations that most exposes any person to danger, as illustrated by the fact that, according to the Nevada Department of Transportation, 31,522 people were injured and 381 people were killed in traffic accidents in Nevada in 2002. Judges and court employees, however, face additional danger in that traveling by motor vehicle can expose them to assault and other dangerous situations based upon their professional affiliation. Many of the following tips may seem

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like common sense and a few may seem extreme, but it the goal of this handbook to equip judges, court employees, and their families with knowledge that is applicable in handling any situation, no matter how remote the possibility.

Identification

- Do not use personalized plates that identify you by name or official position.
- Do not have your name or title displayed at your office parking place.

Auto Maintenance

- Keep your vehicle in good repair, and have it regularly serviced.
- Keep the gas tank at least ½ full.
- Park in well-lit areas.
- Always lock your vehicle, even at home.
- Do not park on the street overnight, if possible.
- Never get out of the car without checking for suspicious persons, activities, or surroundings.
- Leave only the ignition key, or valet key, with parking attendants.
- Do not allow entry into the trunk unless you are there to watch.
- Never leave garage doors open or unlocked.
- Use a remote garage door opener, if available, and enter and exit your vehicle in a secure garage if possible.
- Carry a road side emergency kit in your vehicle.
- Have your key ready when getting ready to return to your vehicle.
- Consider installing a remote starter on your vehicle.

On the Road

- Always travel with a cell phone, and make sure the battery is fully charged. Remember, all cell phones, even ones not on a calling plan, will call 911.
- Always plan your route and have appropriate maps and travel information available to you.
- If traveling long distances across Nevada ensure that trusted individuals know your travel plans, including departure and arrival times.
- Before leaving buildings to get into your vehicle, check the surrounding area to determine if anything of a suspicious nature exists. Display the same wariness before exiting your vehicle.
- Before entering vehicles, check for suspicious objects on the seats and floor, and pay special attention to the back seat.
- Guard against the establishment of routines by varying times, routes, and modes of travel.
- Avoid isolated roads and dark alleys if possible.
- Know the locations of “safe havens” along routes of travel.
- Ride with seatbelts fastened and doors locked.
- Do not allow your vehicle to be boxed in; maintain a minimum 8-foot interval between you and the vehicle in front of you. Try and avoid the use of interior lanes.

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- If you are involved in an accident, call law enforcement, but do not identify yourself as a judge or court official, and wait for law enforcement to arrive.
- When traveling on a deserted road, do not pull over for another vehicle or to render assistance, use a cell phone to notify law enforcement.

If You Are Being Followed

- Circle the block for confirmation of surveillance.
- Do not stop or take other action that could lead to confrontation.
- Do not go home if you think you are being followed.
- Get a description of the vehicle and its occupants. Get the license plate number if possible.
- Go to the nearest “safe haven” and report the incident to local law enforcement.

Recognizing the Signals of an Attack

- Cyclist falling in front of your vehicle.
- Flagman or workman stopping your vehicle.
- Unusual or suspicious police checkpoint.
- Disabled vehicle/accident victims on the road.
- Unusual detours.
- An accident in which your car is struck.
- Car or pedestrian traffic that boxes you in.
- Sudden activity or gunfire.

How to Escape an Attack

- Without subjecting yourself to additional danger, try and draw attention to the situation by sounding your horn.
- Put another vehicle between you and your pursuer.
- Execute an immediate turn and escape, if jumping the curb is necessary use a 30 to 45 degree angle, at no faster than 35 mph.
- Ram blocking vehicle if necessary.
- When at a traffic signal, leave room between you and the car in front of you so you can escape if need be. Also, be aware of pedestrians on street corners and near the intersection.

Buses, Trains, and Taxis

- Vary mode of commercial transportation.
- Select busy stops.
- Do not use the same taxi company every time.
- Do not let anyone direct you to a specific cab.
- Ensure the face of the driver matches the picture on the license.
- Travel with a companion when possible.
- Specify the route you want the taxi to take, if possible.
- Carry exact change in your hand when boarding a bus, or paying for a taxi cab ride.

Appendix C

- Sit in the front of buses, near the driver, or in the middle of cars, away from the doors.
- When arriving by taxi, request that the driver wait until you are inside your destination.

Tips for Safety When Traveling by Air

Air travel poses unique security risks and problems. The following are simple precautions you can take.

Making Travel Arrangements

- Do not use your title on tickets, travel documents, or hotel reservations.
- Remember, window seats and seats in the rear of the plane provide greater protection for an assailant.
- Sitting in an emergency exit row may provide an opportunity to escape.

Precautions at the Airport

- Look for nervous passengers who maintain eye contact with others from a distance. Note behavior that is out of the ordinary.
- Avoid secluded areas that can provide concealment for attackers.
- Do not use your official title on luggage tags.
- Be aware of unattended luggage, and always maintain control of your luggage at all times.
- Report any suspicious activity or situations to airport police.
- Refer to www.tsa.gov for more information on airport and air travel security.

Tips on Security in the Workplace

The Nevada Supreme Court recognizes the variety of workplaces and court facilities that exist within our state, so some of the following tips may or may not be applicable to your specific work situation. However, the basic idea remains the same; use your common sense, best judgment, and whatever security features are in place at your facility in order to help ensure your personal safety and the safety of those you work with.

Security at Building Entrances

- Use only authorized entrances and exits.
- Do not use fire exits or freight exits except in emergencies. Using these exits in non-emergency situations may allow intruders to enter the building.
- When using parking facilities, report any suspicious activity like persons trying to gain entry into parked vehicles, persons carrying suspicious packages, persons loitering in parking facilities, and persons attempting to gain unauthorized access to parking facilities to law enforcement and security personnel immediately.
- If your facility utilizes employee identification badges make sure to always display your badge when entering the facility, never allow anyone else to use your employee badge, and never use your badge to provide entry to visitors.
- Make sure to report any broken windows, open emergency exits, and any other suspicious conditions to law enforcement and security personnel immediately.

Appendix C

- Do not attempt to bring any prohibited items or weapons into court facilities.

Security Inside Buildings

- Make sure all doors leading to public areas have secure locking mechanisms.
- Use an organized key control system to track possession of keys. A key inventory should be conducted semi-annually, and if any keys are missing, locks should be replaced.
- Have facilities cleaned during the day, if possible, so as to not allow cleaning personnel to have access to security alarms or other security features.
- Make sure a file of emergency contacts for employees and coworkers is maintained at your facility.
- If your facility is equipped with alarms, make sure you know the location of alarms and how to use them.
- Do not allow visitors access to secure areas without first having them check in or comply with facility security procedures.
- Report any unauthorized persons in your work area immediately, and try to provide a description of the person as well as the last location in which you saw them.
- Be curious, ask strangers in your work space for identification and ask why they are there.
- Do not admit unexpected visitors, included repair and delivery people, without checking with you supervisor or security personnel first.
- Keep security doors locked at all times.
- Make sure to keep sensitive files, valuable items, and valuable personal property under lock and key at all times.
- Do not leave personal property in locations where it can be stolen or tampered with.
- If working outside of normal business hours; keep all doors locked, never “advertise” that you may be working alone, and be wary of persons concealing themselves in your facility.
- Be alert for strange objects and packages in and around your facility. Report any such packages or objects to law enforcement and security personnel immediately.

Bomb Threats and Personal Threats

- If you receive a bomb threat by telephone immediately call law enforcement and security personnel, and put into action any policies your facility may have regarding such an incident.
- If you receive a threat, make sure to record the following information: telephone number that the threat was received on, time of the threat, and the words of the caller.
- It may seem strange, but sometimes persons making bomb threats may answer questions that can provide valuable information to those handling and investigation the threat. If you receive a threat you should ask the following questions:
 - When will the bomb explode?

Appendix C

- Where is the bomb?
 - What does the bomb look like?
 - What kind of bomb is it?
 - What is your name?
 - What is your address?
 - What is your telephone number?
 - Where are you calling from?
 - Why did you plant the bomb?
- Make special note of the caller's voice (calm, excited, disguised, accent, etc.), the caller's sex, the caller's age (as indicated by voice), if the caller's voice was familiar, and any background noise during the call.
 - If you receive a personal threat via the telephone, follow the same basic procedures as outline above for a bomb threat, but make sure to ask what the caller wants and make note of any related threats and inform law enforcement of any reason you suspect the threat was made.
 - Follow the same guidelines outlined in the earlier section regarding "Suspicious Packages or Mail" when you are at your court facility.

Evacuation of the Workplace

- Make sure you are familiar with any evacuation procedures your facility has in place, and make sure any people who work under you are familiar with the procedures as well.
- Make sure you know the location of emergency exits and make sure you know the best evacuation route from your work area.
- Make sure you know where the fire alarm boxes in your facility are and make sure you know how to activate them.
- Make sure you know who your "floor warden" is, if your facility has "floor wardens", always follow the instructions of your "floor warden" during an emergency, and make sure you know the emergency contact procedures.

Sources:

Federal Trade Commission. Consumer Response Center. Fighting Back Against Identity Theft. August 2006. 1 Aug. 2006.

<<http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/pubs/consumer/idtheft/idt01.htm>>

Judicial Family Institute, A Committee of the Conference of Chief Justices. Security Ideas Away from the Courthouse for Judges, Spouses, and Family. August 2006. 1 Aug. 2006.

<<http://jfi.ncsconline.org/security.html>>

U.S. Department of Justice. U.S. Marshals Service. Offsite Security Handbook for United States Judges. USMS Pub. No. 94. Sep. 2004.

U.S. Department of Justice. U.S. Marshals Service. Personal Security Handbook: How You and Your Family Can Minimize Risks to Personal Safety. USMS Pub. No. 6. Rev. Sep. 2003.

Appendix C

U.S. Department of Justice. U.S. Marshals Service. Security in the Workplace: Improving the Safety of Federal Employees. USMS Pub. No. 16. September 15, 1995.

SUPREME COURT
SAFETY & SECURITY MANUAL

DRAFT

COPY

1. EMERGENCY PERSONNEL/SAFETY TEAM

- a. BUILDING EMERGENCY CONTACTS
- b. LOCAL EMERGENCY CONTACTS
- c. ALARM SYSTEM/SIGNALS
- d. SUPPORT PERSONNEL
- e. ROLES & RESPONSIBILITIES

2. WORKPLACE SAFETY PROGRAM

- a. SAFETY & HEALTH PROGRAM
- b. JOB HAZARD IDENTIFICATION & CONTROL
- c. ACCIDENT REPORTING & INVESTIGATION
- d. SAFETY TRAINING
- e. GENERAL SAFETY RULES
- f. SAFE PRACTICES
- g. WORK PLACE SAFETY FORMS
- h. INDOOR AIR QUALITY
- i. WORKPLACE VIOLENCE PREVENTION

3. COURT HOUSE SECURITY

- a. STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES

4. EVACUTION PLAN

- a. ROLES
- b. CONTINGENCY PLAN
- c. FIRE/EXPLOSION
- d. SHOOTING
- e. EARTHQUAKE
- f. CHEMICAL SPILLS
- g. PUBLIC COUNTER
- h. BOMB THREAT POLICY
- i. DRILL PROCEDURES
- j. FLOOR PLANS
- k. DRILL REPORT

5. HOMELAND SECURITY

TERRORISM

- a. EXPLOSIONS
- b. BIOLOGICAL THREATS
- c. CHEMICAL THREATS
- d. CHEMICAL THREATS
- e. NUCLEAR BLAST
- f. RADIOLOGICAL DISPERSION DEVICE
- g. HOMELAND SECURITY ADVISORY SYSTEM

6. NATURAL DISASTERS

- a. INCLEMENT WEATHER/EMERGENCY SITUATIONS POLICY
- b. HIGH WIND/SNOW/WILDFIRES
- c. EARTHQUAKE PREPAREDNESS PROCEDURES

7. MEDICAL EMERGENCIES

8. RED TAG - HOT WORK PERMIT

9. FIRE ALARM WORK PERMIT

10.INSPECTION REPORTS

- a. FIRE SAFETY
- b. BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL
- c. INSURANCE UNDERWRITER
- d. CO MONITORS
- e. SAFETY TEAM REPORTS
- f. FIRE MARSHAL/FIRE DEPARTMENT
- g. ELEVATOR CERTIFICATES
- h. INDOOR AIR QUALITY

11.WORKPLACE VIOLENCE PREVENTION POLICY

12.OSHA 300 LOGS

13.ELEVATOR RESCUE PROCEDURES

14.PANDEMIC POLICY

15.LOSS OF UTILITIES

- a. WATER PRESSURE
- b. ELECTRICAL POWER
- c. HVAC
- d. SANITARY SEWER

Form for 1.2.1 (Page 1 of 28)
National Sheriffs' Association Physical Security Checklist

Exterior

Yes No

Perimeter (e.g., fences and gates)

- | | | |
|--|-------|-------|
| 1. Is the perimeter of the courthouse grounds clearly defined by a fence, wall, or other type of physical barrier? | _____ | _____ |
| 2. Briefly describe the barrier and its condition. | | |
| 3. Does the barrier limit or control vehicle or pedestrian access to the courthouse? | _____ | _____ |
| 4. Are gates solid and not in need of repair? | _____ | _____ |
| 5. Are gates locked properly? | _____ | _____ |
| 6. Are gate hinges secure? | _____ | _____ |

Lights

- | | | |
|--|-------|-------|
| 1. Is the entire perimeter lighted? | _____ | _____ |
| 2. Are lights on all night? | _____ | _____ |
| 3. Are light fixtures suitable for outside use (i.e., are they weather- and tamper-resistant)? | _____ | _____ |
| 4. Are lights and wiring inspected regularly? | _____ | _____ |
| 5. Lights are controlled: | | |
| a. automatically | _____ | _____ |
| b. manually | _____ | _____ |
| 6. Are control switches inaccessible to unauthorized persons? | _____ | _____ |

Form for 1.2.1 (Page 2 of 28)
National Sheriffs' Association Physical Security Checklist

- | | Yes | No |
|---|-------|-------|
| 7. Do any exterior or perimeter lights have an auxiliary power source? | _____ | _____ |
| 8. Excluding parking areas, describe lighting of the building grounds: | | |
| a. fully illuminated | _____ | _____ |
| b. partially illuminated | _____ | _____ |
| c. not illuminated | _____ | _____ |
| 9. Is the exterior of the building (particularly entry points) sufficiently lighted to discourage unlawful entry attempts or placement of explosives against the walls? | _____ | _____ |
| 10. Are public areas (including parking spaces and walkways) sufficiently lighted to discourage attacks against persons or vehicles? | _____ | _____ |

Parking Areas

- | | | |
|---|-------|-------|
| 1. Is entry to and exit from parking areas controlled by: | | |
| a. guard | _____ | _____ |
| b. an electrically operated gate | _____ | _____ |
| c. other (specify) | | |
| 2. Who provides the guard service? | | |
| 3. What hours are guard services provided?_____ | | |
| 4. Are parking areas watched by closed-circuit TV? | _____ | _____ |
| 5. Are frequent inspections made of parking area and vehicles not guarded or monitored through closed-circuit TV? | _____ | _____ |

Form for 1.2.1 (Page 3 of 28)
National Sheriffs' Association Physical Security Checklist

- | | Yes | No |
|---|-------|-------|
| 6. Is a reserved parking lot on courthouse grounds? | _____ | _____ |
| 7. Is the reserved area closed or locked during nonbusiness hours? | _____ | _____ |
| 8. Is the reserved area protected by a fence? | _____ | _____ |
| 9. Are signs posted there? | _____ | _____ |
| 10. Do reserved parking spaces block access to the courthouse by fire or other emergency vehicles? | _____ | _____ |
| 11. Is there reserved parking for judges? | _____ | _____ |
| 12. Is there reserved parking for court staff? | _____ | _____ |
| 13. Is there reserved parking for jurors and witnesses? | _____ | _____ |
| 14. Who else has reserved parking? _____ | | |
| 15. Are parking spaces reserved by name? | _____ | _____ |
| 16. Are parking spaces reserved by number? | _____ | _____ |
| 17. Is access to the garage strictly controlled? | _____ | _____ |
| 18. Are there adequate communications equipment and an alarm at the guard station in the garage? | _____ | _____ |
| 19. Is there direct access for judges from the garage to nonpublic elevators or restricted corridors? | _____ | _____ |

Landscaping

- | | | |
|--|-------|-------|
| 1. Do landscape features provide places for potential intruders to hide? | _____ | _____ |
|--|-------|-------|

Form for 1.2.1 (Page 4 of 28)
National Sheriffs' Association Physical Security Checklist

- | | Yes | No |
|---|-------|-------|
| 2. Are there items such as bricks, stones, or wooden fence pickets which could be used by intruders as weapons, missiles, or tools? | _____ | _____ |
| If yes, describe items _____ | | |

Building

Doors, Windows, and Other Openings

- | | | |
|--|-------|-------|
| 1. Are all exterior doors at least 1¾-inch solid core wood, metal clad, or metal? | _____ | _____ |
| 2. Are all exterior doors properly equipped with cylinder locks, deadbolts, or quality padlocks and hasps? | _____ | _____ |
| 3. Are doors with windows equipped with double-cylinder locks or quality padlocks? | _____ | _____ |
| 4. Are all exterior doors equipped with intrusion alarms? | _____ | _____ |
| 5. Are all hinge pins internally located, welded, or otherwise treated to prevent easy removal? | _____ | _____ |
| 6. Are doors with panic, or emergency, hardware also fitted with anti-intrusion bars? | _____ | _____ |
| 7. Do doors with panic locks have auxiliary locks for use when the building is not occupied? | _____ | _____ |
| 8. Are exterior locks designed or exterior door frames built so that the door cannot be forced by spreading the frame? | _____ | _____ |
| 9. Are exterior locks firmly mounted so that they cannot be pried off? | _____ | _____ |

Form for 1.2.1 (Page 5 of 28)
National Sheriffs' Association Physical Security Checklist

	Yes	No
10. Are exterior door bolts protected or constructed so that they cannot be cut?	_____	_____
11. Are exterior padlocks in place when doors are unlocked?	_____	_____
12. Are exterior padlock hasps installed so that the screws cannot be removed?	_____	_____
13. Are exterior door padlock hasps made with a grade of steel difficult to cut?	_____	_____
14. Are all unused doors permanently locked?	_____	_____
15. Are windows that could be used for entry protected with:		
a. locking devices	_____	_____
b. metal bars	_____	_____
c. mesh	_____	_____
d. intrusion alarms	_____	_____
e. other (specify) _____		
16. Are window bars and mesh securely fastened to prevent easy removal?	_____	_____
17. Are windows on the ground floor made of tempered glass or ballistic plastic?	_____	_____
18. Are all windows not needed for ventilation permanently sealed or locked?	_____	_____
19. Are openings to the roof (doors, skylights, etc.) securely fastened or locked from the inside?	_____	_____
20. Is internal access to the roof controlled?	_____	_____

Form for 1.2.1 (Page 6 of 28)
National Sheriffs' Association Physical Security Checklist

	Yes	No
21. Is the roof accessible by means of:		
a. fire escape	_____	_____
b. another building	_____	_____
c. a pole or tree	_____	_____
d. other (specify) _____		
22. Do roof openings have intrusion alarms?	_____	_____
23. Are openings to the building (e.g., tunnels, utility and sewer manholes, culverts, and service ports) properly secured?	_____	_____
24. Is a key-control system in effect?	_____	_____
25. Who is responsible for the key control system? _____		
26. Are building entrance keys issued on a limited basis?	_____	_____
27. Are master keys kept securely locked and issued on a strictly controlled basis?	_____	_____
28. Can the key-control officer replace locks and keys at his discretion?	_____	_____
29. Must duplication of keys be approved by the key-control officer?	_____	_____
30. Is the number of entrance doors in use reduced to the minimum necessary?	_____	_____
31. Do judges and court officers have a private entrance to the building?	_____	_____

Form for 1.2.1 (Page 7 of 28)
National Sheriffs' Association Physical Security Checklist

	Yes	No
Ceilings and Walls		
1. Do all walls extend to the ceiling?	_____	_____
2. Are drop or removable ceilings used in the courthouse?	_____	_____
3. Where? _____		
Emergency Power System		
1. Is the main power source dependable?	_____	_____
2. Is there a dependable auxiliary power source for emergencies?	_____	_____
Alarms		
1. Does the courthouse have an intrusion alarm system?	_____	_____
2. Does the system meet Underwriters' Laboratories standards?	_____	_____
3. Is the system regularly tested?	_____	_____
4. How often? _____		
5. Is the system covered by a service and maintenance contract?	_____	_____
6. If not under contract, who provides the service and maintenance? _____		
7. Was the alarm system properly installed?	_____	_____

Form for 1.2.1 (Page 8 of 28)
National Sheriffs' Association Physical Security Checklist

	Yes	No
8. Where does the alarm system terminate?		
a. sheriff's department	_____	_____
b. local law enforcement office	_____	_____
c. commercial control station	_____	_____
d. other (specify) _____		
9. Is there an emergency power source for all alarms?	_____	_____
10. Does the emergency power source cut in automatically?	_____	_____
11. Are records maintained of all alarm signals (e.g., time, date, location, cause, and action taken)?	_____	_____
12. Who keeps these records? _____		
13. What is the response capability (in time and manpower)?		
Time _____		
Manpower _____		
14. What are the weaknesses or gaps in the existing alarm system? _____		

Safe and Vaults

1. Are safes and vaults equipped with an alarm system?	_____	_____
2. What type of alarm system? _____		

Fire Protection

1. Does the courthouse comply with local fire codes?	_____	_____
--	-------	-------

Form for 1.2.1 (Page 9 of 28)
National Sheriffs' Association Physical Security Checklist

- | | Yes | No |
|---|-------|-------|
| 2. Does the fire marshal routinely inspect the courthouse? | _____ | _____ |
| 3. When was the courthouse last inspected by the fire marshal?
_____ | | |
| 4. Did the fire marshal approve the building? | _____ | _____ |
| If not, why? _____ | | |
| 5. Does the building have fire alarms? | _____ | _____ |
| 6. Does the building have smoke detectors? | _____ | _____ |
| 7. Does the building have a sprinkler system? | _____ | _____ |
| 8. Does the building have fire extinguishers? | _____ | _____ |
| 9. Does the building have emergency fire hoses? | _____ | _____ |
| 10. Does the building have an adequate water supply? | _____ | _____ |
| 11. Does the building have standpipes? | _____ | _____ |

Utility Control Points

- | | | |
|---|-------|-------|
| 1. Are utility and plumbing access plates and doors locked or sealed when not in use? | _____ | _____ |
|---|-------|-------|

Attic, Basements, Crawl Spaces, and Air-Conditioning and Heating Ducts

- | | | |
|--|-------|-------|
| 1. Do basement doors have intrusion alarms? | _____ | _____ |
| 2. Are basement doors securely fastened or locked when not in use? | _____ | _____ |

Form for 1.2.1 (Page 10 of 28)
National Sheriffs' Association Physical Security Checklist

- | | Yes | No |
|--|-------|-------|
| 3. Are doors to basements, utility rooms, boiler rooms, crawl spaces, and attics locked when not in use? | _____ | _____ |
| 4. Are crawl spaces secured from unauthorized entry? | _____ | _____ |
| 5. Are air-conditioning and heating vent openings in public areas secure from tampering? | _____ | _____ |

Elevators

- | | | |
|---|-------|-------|
| 1. Are private elevators provided for judges? | _____ | _____ |
| 2. Are certain elevators used exclusively to move prisoners? | _____ | _____ |
| 3. Are prisoner elevators marked "Not for Public Use"? | _____ | _____ |
| 4. Are prisoner elevators controlled by key? | _____ | _____ |
| 5. Are prisoner elevators programmed to bypass floors? | _____ | _____ |
| 6. Do elevators separate prisoners from escorts by metal bars or grilles? | _____ | _____ |
| 7. Are prisoner elevators equipped with: | | |
| a. alarms | _____ | _____ |
| b. telephones | _____ | _____ |
| c. closed-circuit TV | _____ | _____ |
| d. other (specify) _____ | | |

Form for 1.2.1 (Page 11 of 28)
National Sheriffs' Association Physical Security Checklist

Storage Areas for Arms and Dangerous Substances	Yes	No
1. Which of the following dangerous substances are stored in the courthouse?		
a. weapons	_____	_____
b. ammunition	_____	_____
c. tear gas	_____	_____
d. other (specify) _____		
2. Are dangerous substances stored in a restricted area?	_____	_____
3. Are dangerous substances stored in a secure room?	_____	_____
4. Does the storage area have an intrusion alarm?	_____	_____
5. Is the door there solidly constructed?	_____	_____
6. Are hinge pins concealed or welded to prevent removal?	_____	_____
7. Does this door have an adequate cylinder lock?	_____	_____
8. Does this door have an adequate padlock?	_____	_____
9. Do windows in the storage area have steel bars, or mesh, or are they permanently sealed?	_____	_____
10. Is the storage area well ventilated?	_____	_____
11. Does the storage area have fire detection equipment?	_____	_____
12. Does the storage area have a sprinkler system?	_____	_____
Communications		
1. Are communications adequate?	_____	_____

Form for 1.2.1 (Page 12 of 28)
National Sheriffs' Association Physical Security Checklist

	Yes	No
2. If not, what is needed? _____		
3. What communications are available in the courthouse?		
a. telephone	_____	_____
b. radio	_____	_____
c. telegraph	_____	_____
d. teletype	_____	_____
e. public address system	_____	_____
f. other (specify) _____		
4. Is there more than one communications system used exclusively by security personnel?	_____	_____
5. Is there more than one communications system used exclusively for security purposes?	_____	_____
6. Who operates the public address system? _____		
7. Radios in the courthouse consist of:		
a. sheriff's base station	_____	_____
b. unit in security or bailiff office netting to sheriff's base station	_____	_____
c. hand-held portables used by bailiffs	_____	_____
d. hand-held portables used by security officers	_____	_____
e. other (specify) _____		

Form 1.2.1 (Form 13 of 28)
National Sheriffs' Association Physical Security Checklist

- | | Yes | No |
|---|-------|-------|
| 8. Can radios net with: | | |
| a. local police | _____ | _____ |
| b. State police | _____ | _____ |
| c. other sheriffs' departments | _____ | _____ |
| d. other (specify) _____ | | |
| 9. Is maintenance of radio equipment adequate? | _____ | _____ |
| 10. Do base stations have an auxiliary power source? | _____ | _____ |
| 11. Is there a duress code signal? | _____ | _____ |
| 12. Do all telephones go through a building switchboard? | _____ | _____ |
| 13. Does the switchboard have any security safeguards? | _____ | _____ |
| 14. Can teletypes communicate with outside security agencies? | _____ | _____ |
| 15. Which agencies? _____ | | |

Storage Areas for Records

- | | | |
|---|-------|-------|
| 1. Are fire detection devices in the records storage area? | _____ | _____ |
| 2. Is a sprinkler system in the records storage area? | _____ | _____ |
| 3. Are current records stored during nonbusiness hours in locked rooms or locked filing cabinets? | _____ | _____ |
| 4. Are records storage areas inaccessible to unauthorized persons? | _____ | _____ |
| 5. Are there checkout procedures for all records? | _____ | _____ |
| 6. Is space available in or near the clerk's office for the public to review documents? | _____ | _____ |

Form for 1.2.1 (Page 14 of 28)
National Sheriffs' Association Physical Security Checklist

Public Area (waiting areas, rest rooms, and hallways)	Yes	No
1. Are public waiting rooms routinely searched?	_____	_____
2. Are waiting rooms next to courtrooms?	_____	_____
3. Are drop or removable ceilings used in waiting rooms?	_____	_____
4. Are public rest rooms routinely searched?	_____	_____
5. Are rest rooms next to courtrooms?	_____	_____
6. Are drop or removable ceilings used in rest rooms?	_____	_____
7. Do any trash receptacles allow easy concealment of contraband?	_____	_____
8. Are directions (directories and floor plans, if appropriate) clearly posted in all public areas?	_____	_____
 Offices Handling Money		
1. Does the cashier's window have security features?	_____	_____
2. Is a large amount of cash in the office overnight or on weekends?	_____	_____
3. Is there an adequate safe, vault, or strongbox?	_____	_____
4. Is the safe approved by Underwriters' Laboratories?	_____	_____
5. Are safes weighing less than 750 pounds securely fastened to the floor, wall, or set in concrete?	_____	_____
6. Are combinations changed when personnel leave?	_____	_____
7. When was the combination last changed?	_____	_____
8. Is the safe or vault protected by an intrusion alarm?	_____	_____

Form for 1.2.1(Page 15 of 28)
National Sheriffs' Association Physical Security Checklist

- | | Yes | No |
|--|-------|-------|
| 9. Where does the intrusion alarm terminate? | | |
| _____ | | |
| 10. What is the response to an alarm? | | |
| Time _____ | | |
| Manpower _____ | | |
| 11. Is there a duress alarm in these offices? | _____ | _____ |
| 12. Where does the duress alarm terminate? | | |
| _____ | | |
| 13. Who escorts the employee carrying money to the bank? | | |
| a. sheriff | _____ | _____ |
| b. local police | _____ | _____ |
| c. State police | _____ | _____ |
| d. other (specify) _____ | | |
| e. no one | _____ | _____ |

Courthouse Procedures

- | | | |
|--|-------|-------|
| 1. Is there a security procedures manual for the courthouse? | _____ | _____ |
| 2. Are all data current and correct? | _____ | _____ |
| 3. Are emergency plans current? | _____ | _____ |
| 4. Is responsibility for declaring an emergency clearly fixed? | _____ | _____ |

Form for 1.2.1 (Page 16 of 28)
National Sheriffs' Association Physical Security Checklist

	Yes	No
5. Are the authority and chain of command in emergency plans clear and accurate?	_____	_____
6. Are all emergency plans subject to periodic review and updating?	_____	_____
7. Is there a procedure for handling medical emergencies involving the general public?	_____	_____
8. Is first aid equipment, including oxygen, provided throughout the courthouse?	_____	_____
9. Is that equipment periodically checked and tested?	_____	_____
10. Is there a designated security officer for the courthouse?	_____	_____
11. Is there a security guard on duty after normal working hours?	_____	_____
12. If so, when and what hours?		
<hr/>		
13. Is there a procedure for routine daily inspection of the courthouse?	_____	_____
14. Are tenants given periodic instruction about the various emergency procedures?	_____	_____
15. Are support agreements with other agencies written or informal?	_____	_____
16. Are periodic fire and evacuation drills held?	_____	_____

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National Sheriffs' Association Physical Security Checklist

- | | Yes | No |
|---|-------|-------|
| 17. Are periodic security conferences held with: | | |
| a. judges | _____ | _____ |
| b. attorneys | _____ | _____ |
| c. tenants | _____ | _____ |
| d. supervising personnel | _____ | _____ |
| e. custodial personnel | _____ | _____ |
| 18. Are security plans coordinated with appropriate local, State, and Federal agencies? | _____ | _____ |
| 19. Are public, private, and prisoner circulation patterns separated and well defined? | _____ | _____ |
| 20. Is there a routine inspection of packages and shipments entering the courthouse? | _____ | _____ |

Courtrooms and Related Areas

Courtrooms: Location

- | | | |
|---|-------|-------|
| 1. Do spaces above, below, and next to the courtroom present a security hazard? | _____ | _____ |
|---|-------|-------|

Courtrooms: Doors, Windows, and Other Openings

- | | | |
|---|-------|-------|
| 1. Are all unused doors secured? | _____ | _____ |
| 2. Are the keys to all doors strictly controlled? | _____ | _____ |

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- | | Yes | No |
|--|-------|-------|
| 3. Are there separate entrances into the courtroom for: | | |
| a. judges | _____ | _____ |
| b. in-custody defendants | _____ | _____ |
| c. spectators | _____ | _____ |
| 4. Is the prisoner entry door far enough from the public seating area to prevent passing contraband? | _____ | _____ |
| 5. Are all windows draped to obscure vision (particularly of the bench) from outside? | _____ | _____ |

Courtrooms: Lights

- | | | |
|---------------------------------|-------|-------|
| 1. Is there emergency lighting? | _____ | _____ |
| 2. Are lights key controlled? | _____ | _____ |

Courtrooms: Furnishings

- | | | |
|--|-------|-------|
| 1. Is the main area or well separated from the spectators by a barrier? | _____ | _____ |
| 2. Is the judge's bench closed at both ends to restrict access from the well? | _____ | _____ |
| 3. Are the defendant's chair and the witness chair built to allow use of restraints? | _____ | _____ |
| 4. Are spectator seats solidly built and fastened to the floor? | _____ | _____ |
| 5. Are potential weapons, such as drinking glasses, water carafes, and ash trays, kept out of the defendant's reach? | _____ | _____ |

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National Sheriffs' Association Physical Security Checklist

Courtrooms: Security Devices	Yes	No
1. Are routine checks made of:		
a. alarms	_____	_____
b. emergency lighting	_____	_____
c. metal detectors	_____	_____
2. Are metal detectors available for use?	_____	_____
3. Is the bench reinforced to make it bullet resistant?	_____	_____
4. With what? _____		
5. Is there a duress alarm in the courtroom?	_____	_____
6. Are duress alarm buttons installed at:		
a. the bench	_____	_____
b. clerk's station	_____	_____
c. bailiff's station	_____	_____
d. chambers	_____	_____
e. judge's secretary's desk	_____	_____
f. other (specify) _____		
7. Does this alarm have an audio-monitor capability?	_____	_____
8. Is there an acceptable response capability for courtroom duress alarms?	_____	_____
9. Does the courtroom have a telephone?	_____	_____
10. Does the courtroom have a public address system?	_____	_____

Form for 1.2.1 (Page 20 of 28)
National Sheriffs' Association Physical Security Checklist

- | | Yes | No |
|--|-------|-------|
| 11. Does the courtroom have a radio transmitter? | _____ | _____ |
| 12. Is the bailiff equipped with a portable transceiver? | _____ | _____ |
| 13. Does the transceiver net with: | | |
| a. sheriff's base station | _____ | _____ |
| b. security office | _____ | _____ |
| c. other (specify) _____ | | |
| 14. Are additional restraining devices available for use in the courtroom? | _____ | _____ |

Courtrooms: Security Procedures

- | | | |
|--|-------|-------|
| 1. Is there a policy for firearms to be carried into the courtroom by: | | |
| a. bailiffs | _____ | _____ |
| b. law enforcement officer witnesses | _____ | _____ |
| c. law enforcement officer spectators | _____ | _____ |
| d. other (specify) _____ | | |
| 2. Are bailiffs armed in the courtroom? | _____ | _____ |
| 3. Are bailiffs in uniform? | _____ | _____ |
| 4. Are prisoners kept in restraints except when in the courtroom? | _____ | _____ |

Form for 1.2.1 (Page 21 of 28)
National Sheriffs' Association Physical Security Checklist

- | | Yes | No |
|--|-------|-------|
| 5. Are there procedures for the emergency evacuation from the courtroom of: | | |
| a. prisoners | _____ | _____ |
| b. judges | _____ | _____ |
| c. jurors | _____ | _____ |
| 6. Do bailiffs understand procedures for emergency evacuation of prisoners from the courtroom? | _____ | _____ |
| 7. Is there a procedure for a search-screen operation for entry to courtrooms? | _____ | _____ |

Judges' Chambers and Related Offices

- | | | |
|---|-------|-------|
| 1. Are judges' chambers routinely searched for contraband by bailiffs or secretaries? | _____ | _____ |
| 2. Is visitor access controlled by clerks, bailiffs, or secretaries? | _____ | _____ |
| 3. Which? _____ | | |
| 4. Are suspicious packages or letters examined before delivery to judges? | _____ | _____ |
| 5. Do these chambers have more than one means of entry and exit? | _____ | _____ |
| 6. Do doors have automatic closing and locking hardware? | _____ | _____ |
| 7. Are the chambers routinely locked when the judge is not present? | _____ | _____ |

Form for 1.2.1 (Page 22 of 28)
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	Yes	No
8. When occupied by the judge, are the chambers' doors usually:		
a. open	_____	_____
b. closed	_____	_____
c. locked	_____	_____
9. Are outside views, particularly of judges' desks, obscured?	_____	_____
10. Are judges routinely escorted between parking areas, chambers, and the courtroom?	_____	_____
11. Are judges escorted between parking areas, chambers, and the courtroom during high-risk or sensitive trials?	_____	_____
12. Do chambers have duress alarms?	_____	_____
13. Is there acceptable response capability for these alarms?	_____	_____
14. Do any judges carry firearms?	_____	_____
15. Do any judges keep firearms in their chambers?	_____	_____
16. Do any judges keep firearms at the bench?	_____	_____

Witness Waiting Rooms

1. Are witness waiting rooms provided?	_____	_____
2. Is it possible to separate prosecution and defense witnesses?	_____	_____
3. Is public access to waiting rooms restricted?	_____	_____

Form for 1.2.1 (Page 23 of 28)
National Sheriffs' Association Physical Security Checklist

- | | Yes | No |
|--|-------|-------|
| 4. Are light switches located outside the waiting rooms? | _____ | _____ |

Attorney-Client Conference Rooms

- | | | |
|--|-------|-------|
| 1. Are rooms provided in the courthouse for attorney-client conferences? | _____ | _____ |
| 2. Are these rooms secure? | _____ | _____ |
| 3. Do the rooms have drop or removable ceilings? | _____ | _____ |
| 4. Can the rooms be locked? | _____ | _____ |
| 5. Are the rooms routinely searched for contraband before and after use? | _____ | _____ |
| 6. Are conferences visually observed at all times? | _____ | _____ |

Jury Deliberation Room

- | | | |
|--|-------|-------|
| 1. Is the jury deliberation room next to the courtroom or accessible through a controlled passage? | _____ | _____ |
| 2. Are the windows draped? | _____ | _____ |
| 3. Are rest rooms provided as an integral part of the deliberation area? | _____ | _____ |
| 4. Is the deliberation room soundproofed well enough to prevent unauthorized persons from eavesdropping? | _____ | _____ |
| 5. Is the deliberation room routinely searched for contraband before occupancy? | _____ | _____ |
| 6. Is the deliberation room locked when unoccupied? | _____ | _____ |

Form for 1.2.1 (Page 24 of 28)
National Sheriffs' Association Physical Security Checklist

Prisoner Reception Area	Yes	No
1. Are prisoners brought from jail to the reception area in the courthouse by:		
a. elevator	_____	_____
b. stairway	_____	_____
c. tunnel	_____	_____
d. bridge	_____	_____
e. vehicle	_____	_____
f. foot	_____	_____
2. Do prisoners brought from outside the courthouse enter through a:		
a. public entrance	_____	_____
b. private entrance	_____	_____
c. sally port	_____	_____
3. Is the area equipped with gates that can close the area to the public?	_____	_____
4. Is there more than one means for vehicles to exit from the area?	_____	_____
5. Are gates electronically controlled from a remote station?	_____	_____
6. Is an interlocking system used so that the outer gate can be closed and locked before the door to the building is opened?	_____	_____
7. Is this area monitored by closed-circuit TV?	_____	_____

Form for 1.2.1 (Page 25 of 28)
National Sheriffs' Association Physical Security Checklist

- | | Yes | No |
|---|-------|-------|
| 8. Is this area used exclusively for prisoner movement? | _____ | _____ |
| 9. Is the entrance for prisoners out of public view? | _____ | _____ |

Restricted and Secure Passageways

- | | | |
|--|-------|-------|
| 1. Do prisoners walk through public areas when going from temporary holding areas to court? | _____ | _____ |
| 2. Are restricted passages also used by judges and court staff? | _____ | _____ |
| 3. Are restricted or secure passageways monitored by closed-circuit TV? | _____ | _____ |
| 4. Are law enforcement officers required to leave guns in locked cabinets before entering restricted or secure passages? | _____ | _____ |
| 5. Are restricted passageways locked with keys that cannot normally be duplicated commercially? | _____ | _____ |
| 6. Are keys to secure passageways issued to people other than sheriff's personnel? | _____ | _____ |
| 7. Are security staff forbidden to remove secure passageway keys from the building? | _____ | _____ |
| 8. Are the stairways used for prisoner movement adequately lighted? | _____ | _____ |
| 9. Are stairways and stairwells enclosed with protective metal grilles? | _____ | _____ |
| 10. Are stairways monitored by closed-circuit TV? | _____ | _____ |

Form for 1.2.1 (Page 26 of 28)
National Sheriffs' Association Physical Security Checklist

Temporary Holding Areas	Yes	No
1. Are temporary holding facilities located in the court building?	_____	_____
2. If not, where are prisoners held? _____		
3. How many temporary holding cells are there? _____		
4. Are prisoners moved from the reception area to a temporary holding area by a secure or restricted:		
a. elevator	_____	_____
b. stairway	_____	_____
c. tunnel	_____	_____
d. bridge	_____	_____
5. Do temporary holding cells open directly into:		
a. the court	_____	_____
b. a restricted passage	_____	_____
6. Are adequate toilet facilities available for prisoners?	_____	_____
7. Are lights for the holding area controlled from outside the cells?	_____	_____
8. Do cells have emergency lights?	_____	_____
9. Do cell doors have observation ports?	_____	_____

Form for 1.2.1 (Page 27 of 28)
National Sheriffs' Association Physical Security Checklist

	Yes	No
10. Is at least one holding cell equipped for audio or visual coverage of courtroom proceedings?	_____	_____
11. How are cell doors locked:		
a. electrically	_____	_____
b. manually		
12. Are cell doors locked and unlocked from:		
a. a remote command center	_____	_____
b. directly	_____	_____
c. both	_____	_____
13. Are keys to temporary holding cells issued to people other than sheriff's personnel?	_____	_____
14. Are temporary holding areas locked with keys that cannot normally be duplicated commercially?	_____	_____
15. Are cells and areas used by prisoners routinely searched for contraband before and after use?	_____	_____
16. Are cells built securely and in a way that reduces opportunities for self-inflicted injuries by prisoners?	_____	_____
17. Are law enforcement officers required to leave guns in locked cabinets before entering temporary holding areas?	_____	_____
18. Are prisoners kept in restraints except when in the cell?	_____	_____
19. Are additional restraining devices available?	_____	_____
20. Are telephones available?	_____	_____

Form for 1.2.1 (Page 28 of 28)
National Sheriffs' Association Physical Security Checklist

- | | Yes | No |
|---|-------|-------|
| 21. Are juveniles routinely separated from other prisoners? | _____ | _____ |
| 22. Are females routinely separated from other prisoners? | _____ | _____ |
| 23. Do prisoner feeding procedures present escape opportunities? | _____ | _____ |
| 24. Are there procedures for the emergency evacuation of prisoners from temporary holding areas? | _____ | _____ |
| 25. Do security and transportation officers understand procedures for emergency evacuation of prisoners from temporary holding areas? | _____ | _____ |

Security Equipment Storage Area

- | | | |
|--|-------|-------|
| 1. Are the number of gun cabinets adequate? | _____ | _____ |
| 2. Are storage areas locked with keys that cannot normally be duplicated commercially? | _____ | _____ |

Prisoner Procedures

- | | | |
|--|-------|-------|
| 1. Is there a procedure for handling the medical emergencies of prisoners? | _____ | _____ |
|--|-------|-------|

Please use an additional page to offer any specific comments or suggestions for improvements in the security of the courthouse.

Appendix F

Essential Ten Elements for Effective Courtroom Safety and Security Planning

1. Operational Security: Standard Operating Procedures

This is one of the most critical deficiencies in the state court system today. Standard Operating Procedures are not being following and for full safety, there needs to be 100 percent compliance.

2. Facility Security Planning: The Self-Audit Survey of Court Facilities

This point emphasizes the need to know the strengths and weaknesses of the physical structure of the courtroom to best protect the people inside.

3. Emergency Preparedness and Response: Continuity of Operations

At any moment, courts can be affected by natural or unnatural disasters; however, they must continue to operate and serve the public in such an event. There needs to be a greater awareness and identification of command structure, protocols, and communication routes for such emergencies and responses.

4. Disaster Recovery: Essential Elements of a Plan

The point emphasizes the need to ensure that adequate procedures are in place to recover lost or vulnerable information in the event of an emergency.

5. Threat Assessment

The federal government currently has an effective threat assessment protocol in practice. However, for security and safety purposes, state courts need to begin identifying serious threats so they may prepare for the proper protective action.

6. Incident Reporting

States must develop an appropriate incident report form that allows for capturing data on items such as intelligence and funding needs.

7. Funding

This is another critical deficiency facing the court system today and for years past. Equipment can be bought at moderate costs but without the trained personnel, the equipment is of little to no use. In addition, many state court administrators are troubled by the lack of federal funds. While much money is appropriate to homeland security, very little is dedicated to state courts.

8. Security Equipment and Costs

State courts must have updated and readily available information on what technology is available to them and how much it costs.

9. Resources and Partnerships

Strong and effective partnerships among state courts, law enforcement, and county

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commissioners must be developed to ensure successful security operations.

10. New Courthouse Design

As new courthouses are being constructed, this point emphasizes the opportunity to ensure that up-to-date physical safety measures are included in the design stage.

More About The National Center for State Courts

The mission of NCSC is to improve the administration of justice through leadership and service to state courts, and courts around the world. NCSC disseminates information to state court leaders on key national policy issues, and helps advocate their policies with Congress as well as supporting several prestigious national organizations.

More on The National Summit

The NCSC has secured support and participation of Members of Congress, Department of Justice officials, and state and county court officials as well as members from public safety and state and local governments in the National Summit. President Mary McQueen, who has been a strong and vocal leader of the state court community has promised her members and the communities they serve that the outcome of the Summit will not only provide best practices for improving safety and security, but will use the power of its participants to call for necessary funding to implement such plans.

ASSEMBLY BILL NO. 191—COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY

(ON BEHALF OF THE NEVADA SUPREME COURT)

FEBRUARY 27, 2007

Referred to Committee on Judiciary

SUMMARY—Prohibits a permittee from carrying a concealed firearm in a courthouse, court facility or public building partially occupied by a court without proper authorization. (BDR 15-648)

FISCAL NOTE: Effect on Local Government: No.
Effect on the State: No.

~

EXPLANATION – Matter in *bolded italics* is new; matter between brackets ~~omitted material~~ is material to be omitted.

AN ACT relating to concealed firearms; prohibiting a permittee from carrying a concealed firearm in a courthouse, court facility or public building partially occupied by a court without proper authorization; and providing other matters properly relating thereto.

Legislative Counsel's Digest:

1 Existing law prohibits a permittee from carrying a concealed firearm in a
2 courthouse or courtroom unless: (1) the permittee is a judge who is carrying a
3 concealed firearm in the courthouse or courtroom in which he presides; (2) the
4 permittee has received authorization from a judge to carry a concealed firearm
5 while in the courtroom of the judge and to and from the courtroom of the judge; (3)
6 the permittee is a prosecuting attorney; or (4) the permittee is employed in the
7 courthouse or courtroom. (NRS 202.3673) This bill prohibits a permittee from
8 carrying a concealed firearm in a courthouse, court facility or public building
9 partially occupied by a court without prior written authorization from the chief
10 judge or his designee. A permittee who violates this provision is guilty of a
11 misdemeanor.



* A B 1 9 1 *

Appendix G

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEVADA, REPRESENTED IN
SENATE AND ASSEMBLY, DO ENACT AS FOLLOWS:

1 **Section 1.** Chapter 202 of NRS is hereby amended by adding
2 thereto a new section to read as follows:

3 1. *A permittee shall not carry a concealed firearm while he is*
4 *on the premises of a courthouse, court facility or public building*
5 *partially occupied by a court unless he obtains prior written*
6 *authorization from the chief judge or his designee.*

7 2. *A person who violates subsection 1 is guilty of a*
8 *misdemeanor.*


9 3. *As used in this section, "chief judge" means the chief*
10 *judge of a court who exercises authority over the courthouse,*
11 *court facility or public building partially occupied by a court or, if*
12 *there is more than one chief judge in the courthouse, court facility*
13 *or public building partially occupied by a court, the chief judge*
14 *who is chosen to act as the chief judge for the purposes of this*
15 *section.*

16 **Sec. 2.** NRS 202.3653 is hereby amended to read as follows:

17 202.3653 As used in NRS 202.3653 to 202.369, inclusive, *and*
18 *section 1 of this act*, unless the context otherwise requires:

19 1. "Concealed firearm" means a loaded or unloaded pistol,
20 revolver or other firearm which is carried upon a person in such a
21 manner as not to be discernible by ordinary observation.

22 2. "Department" means the Department of Public Safety.

23 3. "Permit" means a permit to carry a concealed firearm issued
24 pursuant to the provisions of NRS 202.3653 to 202.369, inclusive 
25 *, and section 1 of this act.*

26 **Sec. 3.** NRS 202.3673 is hereby amended to read as follows:

27 202.3673 1. Except as otherwise provided in subsections 2
28 and 3, a permittee may carry a concealed firearm while he is on the
29 premises of any public building.

30 2. A permittee shall not carry a concealed firearm while he is
31 on the premises of a public building that is located on the property
32 of a public airport.

33 3. A permittee shall not carry a concealed firearm while he is
34 on the premises of:

35 (a) A public building that is located on the property of a public
36 school or the property of the Nevada System of Higher Education,
37 unless the permittee has obtained written permission to carry a
38 concealed firearm while he is on the premises of the public building
39 pursuant to paragraph (c) of subsection 3 of NRS 202.265.

40 (b) A public building that has a metal detector at each public
41 entrance or a sign posted at each public entrance indicating that no
42 firearms are allowed in the building, unless the permittee is not



Appendix G

1 prohibited from carrying a concealed firearm while he is on the
2 premises of the public building pursuant to subsection 4.

3 4. The provisions of paragraph (b) of subsection 3 do not
4 prohibit:

5 (a) ~~[(a)]~~ ~~A permittee who is a judge from carrying a concealed~~
6 ~~firearm in the courthouse or courtroom in which he presides or from~~
7 ~~authorizing a permittee to carry a concealed firearm while in the~~
8 ~~courtroom of the judge and while traveling to and from the~~
9 ~~courtroom of the judge.~~

10 ~~—(b)]~~ A permittee who is a prosecuting attorney of an agency or
11 political subdivision of the United States or of this State from
12 carrying a concealed firearm while he is on the premises of a public
13 building.

14 ~~[(e)]~~ (b) A permittee who is employed in the public building
15 from carrying a concealed firearm while he is on the premises of the
16 public building.

17 ~~[(d)]~~ (c) A permittee from carrying a concealed firearm while he
18 is on the premises of the public building if the permittee has
19 received written permission from the person in control of the public
20 building to carry a concealed firearm while the permittee is on the
21 premises of the public building.

22 5. A person who violates subsection 2 or 3 is guilty of a
23 misdemeanor.

24 6. As used in this section, “public building” ~~[(means)]~~ :

25 (a) *Includes* any building or office space occupied by:

26 ~~[(a)]~~ (1) Any component of the Nevada System of Higher
27 Education and used for any purpose related to the System; or

28 ~~[(b)]~~ (2) The Federal Government, the State of Nevada or any
29 county, city, school district or other political subdivision of the State
30 of Nevada and used for any public purpose.

31 ➤ If only part of the building is occupied by an entity described in
32 this ~~[(subsection,)]~~ *paragraph*, the term means only that portion of the
33 building which is so occupied.

34 (b) *Does not include a courthouse, court facility or public*
35 *building partially occupied by a court.*

36 **Sec. 4.** This act becomes effective upon passage and approval.

