Tuesday, February 13, 2024, Oral Argument
DAYANI (FAHD) VS. DISTRICT COURT (STATE)
Las Vegas – 1:30 P.M. – Stiglich/Pickering/Parraguirre
MELTON (WENDELL) VS. STATE
Las Vegas – 2:00 P.M. – Stiglich/Pickering/Parraguirre
DAYANI (FAHD) VS. DISTRICT COURT (STATE)
Docket No. 86847
Las Vegas – 1:30 P.M. – Stiglich/Pickering/Parraguirre
Petitioner Fahd Dayani was indicted by a grand jury on two counts of trafficking in a controlled substance. Over 200 days after his arraignment on the charges, Dayani filed a motion to dismiss the indictment based on prosecutorial misconduct during the grand jury proceedings, alleging that the State knowingly failed to present exculpatory evidence pursuant to NRS 172.145(2). The district court denied the motion on procedural grounds, ruling that the motion should have been properly brought as a pretrial petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the statutory time limit for which had passed. Dayani now brings this original petition for a writ of mandamus, asserting that his challenge was properly brought as a motion to dismiss and, therefore, the district court manifestly abused its discretion in denying the motion as untimely. The petition asks this court to reverse the denial and direct the district court to hear the motion on its merits.
MELTON (WENDELL) VS. STATE
Docket No. 84864
Las Vegas – 2:00 P.M. – Stiglich/Pickering/Parraguirre
Wendell Melton was convicted of first-degree murder with a deadly weapon; child abuse, neglect, or endangerment with a deadly weapon; and child abuse, neglect, or endangerment, and sentenced to 28 years to life. He raises several issues on appeal, including: (1) whether his Sixth Amendment right to a representative cross section of the community on his jury venire was violated; (2) whether the trial court erred when it refused to answer a question by the jury; (3) whether the trial court erred when it did not restrain the victim’s mother’s speech; (4) whether the prosecutor mischaracterized evidence during closing arguments; (5) whether the district court plainly erred when it failed to make findings on the factors under the sentencing-enhancement statute; and (6) whether potential state witness statements warranted a new trial.